Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Theses & Dissertations

Department of Finance and Insurance

2009

The customer is king : mutual fund relationships and analyst
recommendations
Ping LIU

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/fin_etd
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Liu, P. (2009). The customer is king: Mutual fund relationships and analyst recommendations (Master's
thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.14793/fin_etd.1

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Finance and Insurance at Digital
Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Terms of Use
The copyright of this thesis is owned by its
author. Any reproduction, adaptation,
distribution or dissemination of this thesis
without express authorization is strictly
prohibited.

All rights reserved.

THE CUSTOMER IS KING: MUTUAL FUND RELATIONSHIPS AND ANALYST
RECOMMENDATIONS

LIU PING

MPHIL

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2009

THE CUSTOMER IS KING: MUTUAL FUND RELATIONSHIPS AND ANALYST
RECOMMENDATIONS

by
LIU Ping

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Philosophy in Business (Finance and Insurance)

Lingnan University

2009

ABSTRACT
The Customer is King: Mutual Fund Relationships and Analyst Recommendations
by
LIU Ping
Master of Philosophy

I investigate whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms
influence sell-side analyst coverage and recommendations. Using a comprehensive
sample of analyst recommendations in China over the 2004-2008 period, I find that
the likelihood of analyst coverage and analysts’ relative recommendations,
benchmarked against consensus recommendations, are positively associated with the
mutual fund business relationship. I measure the business relation by the weight of a
stock in the mutual fund client’s portfolio and the commission revenue generated
from the mutual fund clients. My results show that mutual funds take advantage of
these optimistic recommendations by selling the stocks. I also find evidence that
analysts employed in politically connected brokerage firms inflate their
recommendations on state-controlled listed enterprises. Lastly, I examine the
short-term and long-term investment returns from a strategy that follows the analyst
recommendations. In the short-term, I find positive stock returns, which benefit the
client mutual funds. However, I also find evidence that investors recognize the
conflict of interest and caps the stock price increases. In the longer-term, the strong
buy and buy recommendations yield zero or negative stock returns.
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The Customer is King: Mutual Fund Relationships and Analyst
Recommendations

Chapter 1. Introduction

Recent events call into question the integrity of the sell-side equity research
industry. Stock analysts are accused of being partly responsible for the dot-com
bubble and the more recent failure to detect the accounting fraud at Enron and other
companies. Failure to predict the financial crisis that currently engulfs the world’s
economies and analysts’ positive recommendations on banking stocks that
subsequently crashed have further eroded confidence in the profession 1. One popular
explanation for the poor performance of investment analysts is that they sacrifice
their objectivity by publicly touting stocks of their employers’ clients (or potential
clients), in exchange for lucrative business deals from those clients.
Ideally, an analyst’s role is to search for economic and firm-specific information,
to critically evaluate and interpret this information, and to write research reports and
make investment recommendations that are useful to investors. The analyst should be
objective and exercise independent judgment. However, recent research has
identified a number of conflicts of interest that impede an analyst’s function as an
objective financial intermediary. For example, stock analysts are under pressure to
produce optimistic forecasts to maintain good relationships with listed company
management (Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan, 1998; Lim, 2001). Absent a good
relationship, an analyst will be unable to question management about a firm’s
operations, policies, and prospects. As another example, trading departments may
compel their in-house analysts to generate optimistic reports in order to boost trading
commissions from investors (Irvine, 2001, 2004; Jackson, 2005; Cowen, Groysberg
and Healy, 2006; Agrawal and Chen, 2008). Investors are more likely to trade if there
1

For details, please refer to Reingold, D., Reingold, J., 2006. Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst.
HarperCollins, New York.
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is a buy recommendation. Although sell recommendations can be valuable, many
investors may be prevented, legally, operationally, or psychologically, from short
selling and so the trading commissions earned from sell recommendations will be
lower than for buy recommendations. As a third example, investment bankers may
pressure their research departments to issue favorable reports on the stocks of their
current or prospective clients in order to win lucrative underwriting business (Lin
and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; O’Brien, McNichols and Lin,
2005; Ljungvist, Marston, Starks, Wei and Yan, 2007) and make capital raising (e.g.,
IPOs, SEOs, debt-issues) more successful. Recently, Mola and Guidolin (2009)
identify another source of conflict that can arise in financial services firms that house
mutual fund operations as well as brokerage units. They find that brokerage analysts
in the U.S. upgrade their recommendations on stocks owned by mutual funds that are
part of the same full-service financial group (these are termed affiliated mutual
funds). Mola and Guidolin argue that the analysts are under pressure to recommend
these stocks to improve the affiliated mutual fund performance. These conflicts of
interest have been the subject of criminal and civil lawsuits and have resulted in new
laws and regulations. Most of the relevant literature, as well as the litigation, come
from the U.S. although other countries are not immune to these problems.
I analyze the conflicts of interest that pertain to pressures that are placed on
analysts to inflate (or, occasionally, deflate) their recommendations on a stock using
Chinese data. This thesis is comprised of one main chapter (Chapter 4), two
background chapters (Chapters 2 and 3), and an introductory chapter (this chapter)
and a concluding chapter (Chapter 5). In Chapter 2, I offer a succinct yet thorough
literature review on conflicts of interests in the sell-side equity research industry. In
particular, I review the major studies on the incentives of analysts to bias their
reports, the forces that moderate analyst bias, and the impact of such conflicts of
interests on customers of analyst reports. I trace the development of mutual funds
and brokerages in modern-day China in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 4, I investigate whether the business relations between mutual funds
2

and brokerage firms influence sell-side analyst coverage and recommendations using
a comprehensive sample of analyst recommendations in China over the 2004-2008
period. This chapter forms the main basis of my thesis. I find that a broker makes
positively biased investment recommendations on those stocks already held by its
mutual fund clients in order to help bolster the performance of the clients’ portfolios
and thus earn more business from them. Thus, I turn the normal presumption of an
analyst’s recommendation informing mutual funds’ investment decisions on its head.
A simple business relationship with mutual funds may create a conflict of interest for
the analyst. My study therefore contributes to the extant literature on the
independence of sell-side analysts by identifying another major source of conflict
facing stock analysts.
An important contribution of my study is that I use data from China, a country
where relatively little is known about the financial services industry despite its rapid
development in recent years. The focus on China allows us to examine the influence
of the state on analysts’ recommendations. A major feature of China’s financial
system is the dominant government ownership of listed firms (Chen, Firth, Xin and
Xu, 2008). Analysts may be under pressure to make favorable investment
recommendations on state controlled listed firms and I expect this influence will be
stronger in politically connected brokerages. 2 By examining whether analysts’
recommendations are biased when the listed company is controlled by the state and
when there are political connections between the state and the brokerage, my study
contributes to the small but growing literature on political connection biases in
finance (e.g. Khwaja and Mian, 2005a; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006;
Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008).
I organize the remainder of the thesis as follows. Chapter 2 offers a thorough
literature review on conflicts of interests in the sell-side equity research industry. I
discuss the development of the mutual fund industry and brokerage firms in Chapter
3. Chapter 4 describes the core empirical results on mutual fund relationships and
2

Following Firth, Lin, Liu and Wong. (2009b), I define a brokerage firm to be politically connected if the
brokerage firm’s CEO was a government official before he/she takes the position in the brokerage firm.
3

analyst recommendations. Chapter 5 concludes.

4

Chapter 2. Literature Review

A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction can potentially gain
from taking actions that are detrimental to its counterparty. In the context of a
sell-side equity analyst 3, a conflict of interest arises if the analyst’s employer---- the
financial institution--- obtains a direct advantage, such as underwriting business or an
increase in trading commission, by providing biased analyst reports on a company to
its customers.
For academia, recent attention paid to conflicts of interests in the equity
research industry examines the following three broad aspects. What are the sources
of conflicts of interests in equity research industry? Are the mechanisms that control
the conflicts of interests in market economies also effective in equity research
industry? Do conflicts of interests have adverse impacts on customers of analyst
reports? In this chapter, I review the recent literature and explain how the extant
papers contribute to each of the aforementioned three aspects. There are a large and
growing number of papers examining each of the three broad questions. Therefore,
my review is selective and should be viewed as such. Most of the studies reviewed in
this chapter use data from the United States. This may limit the generalizability of
the results although the non-U.S. research often reaches the same conclusions.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 identifies the sources of conflicts
of interests inherent in analyst reports. I turn to the moderating forces of the conflicts
of interests in the equity research industry in Section 2. Section 3 examines the
impact of such conflicts of interests on the customers of analyst reports. Section 4
concludes.
2.1 The source of conflicts of interest inherent in analyst report

In many cases, financial institutions have better information than buyers over

3
Sell-side analysts are those who work for brokerage firms. Buy-side analysts are those who work for
institutional investors. In this chapter, I focus exclusively on the former type of analysts. In this thesis, “analyst”
denotes a sell-side analyst unless otherwise stated.
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which products best serves buyers’ needs (Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 2007). Such
information asymmetries open the door to conflicts of interests. Bolton, Freixas and
Shapiro analyze the situations under which the customers have difficulties
ascertaining the quality of the service provided by financial institutions. Under such
conditions, the financial institutions might provide tainted advice, for example,
biased analyst recommendations, to customers.
However, the analyst reports do not completely fit into Bolton et al.’s
framework. Historically, the primary customers of analyst reports are institutional
investors. The institutional investors do not directly pay for the analyst services of
brokerage firms but do so indirectly through trading commissions directed to the
brokerage firms. They receive analyst reports from several brokerage firms on a
regular basis since most of the institutional investors allocate their trading
commissions among different brokers. Many institutional investors have their own
research departments and rely on analyst reports from brokerage firms to provide
different viewpoints than they get from their own analysts. Beginning in the 1990s,
analyst reports have become more available to retail investors as individuals’
portfolios increase in value and as they become important customers to the brokers.
In contrast to institutional investors, retail investors lack cost-effective ways to
evaluate the quality of analyst services and to examine the past performance of
analyst forecasts. Moreover, retail investors focus mainly on the target price or
investment recommendations featured in analysts’ reports and do not have the time or
expertise to evaluate the detailed information. These neglected details might contain
information related to conflicts of interests. Based on published information
(litigation cases 4, newspaper investigations, journal articles), conflicts of interests in
the equity research industry have been escalating since the 1990s.
The deregulation and diversification of financial institutions creates a fertile
4

For example, in November 2003, Morgan Stanley paid a $50 million civil penalty as a result of an agreement
with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) to settle charges of conflicts of interest in selling in-house
funds to investors. According to the charges, Morgan Stanley had improperly provided its brokers with incentives
to sell Morgan Stanley funds over those run by outside fund companies. These incentives included the widespread
use of contests among brokers to promote Morgan Stanley funds. See Solomon and Lauricella, 2003. Morgan
Stanley to settle with SEC. Wall Street Journal November 17, C9.
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ground for conflicts of interests that might not create value for shareholders.
Literatures on corporate diversification suggest that the market value of a
conglomerate is lower than that of a portfolio of comparable specialized firms, which
is called diversification discount (Lang and Stulz, 1994). Similar findings also hold
in the finance industry (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007). So far, many of the identified
sources of conflicts of interests in the equity research industry stem from the
diversification of financial institutions where there is intense pressure to cross-sell
products and services and to maximize total revenues.
One popular explanation for analyst upward bias is that analysts working for
investment banks were compromised by the hefty bonuses they could earn from
writing favorable reports on their employers’ investment banking clients and
potential investment banking clients. Here, the analysts are pressured by their
investment banking departments to issue optimistic reports. Dugar and Nathan (1995)
find that analysts from brokerage firms that provide investment banking services to a
company (investment banker analysts) are more optimistic on that company
compared to other analysts. In their study, they identify a sample of firms and their
investment bankers. They match each analyst report from the investment bank with a
report produced by an independent analyst. They find that analysts are more
optimistic on their employers’ investment banking clients as regards earnings
forecasts and recommendations. Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei and Yan (2007)
examine analyst optimism while controlling for their issuance history. They also find
that analysts issued more optimistic than market consensus reports when they are
affiliated with investment banks that have existing business ties with the firm
covered. In contrast, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) fail to find significant associations
between existing investment banking relationships and analysts’ responsiveness to
bad news once they control for the institutional ownership of the stocks.
Several papers examine analyst behavior following equity offerings and reach
similar findings: analysts affiliated to the underwriters are more optimistic compared
with unaffiliated analysts on the equity offerings. McNichols and Lin (1998) examine
7

analyst reports on firms with seasoned equity offerings and find that analysts
affiliated to lead underwriters are more optimistic on recommendations and growth
forecasts, but not on one-year and two-year ahead earnings forecasts. Dechow,
Hutton and Sloan (2000) reach similar findings using a sample of 1,179 equity
offerings. Michaely and Womack (1999) examine 391 IPOs and find that stocks
receiving buy recommendations from an investment banker’s analysts perform
poorly. O’Brien, McNichols and Lin (2005) find that affiliated analysts downgrade
their buy recommendations more slowly than unaffiliated analysts subsequent to
equity offerings. In contrast, Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2006) examine the IPOs in
1999 and 2000 and find no evidence for a different reaction between affiliated and
unaffiliated analysts’ initiation of coverage once they control for recommendation
characteristics and timing even though affiliated analysts are more optimistic. James
and Karceski (2006) find that IPO firms with poor aftermarket performance are given
higher target-prices and strong buy recommendations by affiliated analysts.
Although many studies identify investment banking pressure as a potential
source of conflicts of interests in equity research industry, empirical support is mixed.
Firstly, though it is often taken for granted that investment bankers pressure their
analysts when they can, there is no direct evidence that investment bankers can
benefit from upward biased in-house analyst reports. For example, Ljungqvist,
Martson and Wilhelm (2006) investigate whether analyst behavior influences banks’
likelihood of winning underwriting mandates for debt and equity offerings in
1993-2002 and find no evidence that aggressive analyst behavior helps banks win
underwriting mandates. According to them, the main determinants of the lead-bank
choice are the strength of prior underwriting and lending relationships. Similarly,
Clarke, Khorana, Patel and Rau (2007) find no evidence that optimistic earnings
forecasts or recommendations affects investment banking order flow. What is more,
analyst optimism could stem from selection bias or some unknown underlying
factors. For example, Bajari and Krainer (2004) find that when controlling for the
selection bias, conflicts of interests due to investment banking do not have a
8

significant impact on analyst optimism on firms in the NASDAQ 100 from 1998 to
2003. Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006) find that corporate net external
financing determines analyst optimism. The analysts are more optimistic on firms
with more equity issuance and less optimistic on firms with more equity repurchases.
However, they find that the investment banking relations between analysts’
employers and covered firms are not significant determinants of analyst optimism.
Less optimistic earnings forecasts do not necessarily mean that conflicts of interests
do not exist. Analysts might issue pessimistic reports so that the firms can easily beat
the analyst forecasts. A positive earnings surprise pushes the stock price upward.
Such pessimism is prevalent during bull market periods since the market penalizes
negative earnings surprises severely during hot market periods (Chan, Karceski and
Lakonishok, 2006). There is no certainty that an analyst who fails to change a
recommendation as a stock price falls is providing a misleading or fraudulent
recommendation (Mehran and Stulz, 2007). The analyst might stick to his/her
valuation model and hold on to his/her current recommendation rating until the input
to valuation model changes. In sum, the empirical evidence of the impact of
investment banking pressure on biased analyst reports is mixed.
Another conflict of interest arises from brokerage activity. A brokerage firm
benefits from more trading. Therefore, the brokerage department will pressure its
in-house analysts to issue optimistic reports. The rationale is as follows: if investors
follow analyst recommendations, the buy recommendations and upgrades will
generate more trades than sell recommendations and downgrades. Since short-selling
is costly and often restrictive to most investors, the negative analyst opinions only
generate trades from investors who already hold the stock.
Several papers examine whether upward biased analyst reports generate more
trades. Irvine (2001) uses Toronto Stock Exchange trading data and finds that buy
recommendations generate more trades. Earnings forecasts bias (forecasts minus
actual earnings) are not associated with more trades but forecasts relative to market
consensus are. Similarly, Jackson (2005) also finds that optimistic analysts generate
9

more trades, as do high-reputation analysts, using data from the Australian stock
market.
The last form of conflict of interests comes from the pressure of affiliated asset
management departments. Analysts working for a full-service brokerage firm have
incentives to research a stock and promote its purchase by recommending it once
their asset-management department invests in that stock. The analysts do so to
support the performance of the affiliated fund family. In exchange, the analysts
receive incentive compensation from their affiliated fund family. In essence, this is a
type of “front-running” conflict (“front-running” is where the analyst or affiliated
investor buys before the analyst publishes a “buy” recommendation). Mola and
Guidolin (2008) analyze a large sample of recommendations issued by analysts
working for full-service brokerage firms from 1995 to 2006 and find that analysts are
likely to issue frequent and favorable ratings to a stock after the analysts’ affiliated
mutual funds have invested in that stock. An analyst’s decision to upgrade a stock to
“strong buy” ratings is significantly related to the portfolio weight of that stock in the
fund family.

2.2 The moderating forces of conflicts of interests

Conflicts of interests could be acute but have no material impact on the quality
of analyst service because of mitigating forces. First of all, an analyst has an
incentive to protect his/her own reputation. If a stock analyst always issues biased
reports to help their employers win investment banking deals, investors will
eventually recognize the bias and ignore the analysts’ future recommendations. As a
result, the analyst will lose the ability to help his/her employers. Therefore, in the
repeated interactions between analysts and investors, reputation is very important and
can discipline an analyst’s opportunistic behavior.
Jackson (2005) shows that more accurate analysts have higher reputations. A
highly reputed analyst is more capable of biasing his/her recommendations to
10

generate more trades. If the reputation is extremely valuable and extremely fragile,
the analyst will ignore the pressure from the investment banking department and the
brokerage department. Therefore, conflicts of interests do not have a material impact
on analyst reports. Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006) also point out that an
analyst is faced with a tradeoff between preserving private career concerns and
potential short term economic payoffs associated with biased recommendations. The
analyst is more likely to taint his/her advice when the potential economic payoff
associated with the biased reports is large and when the reputation loss is less.
Many papers document the benefits of being selected as an All-American
analyst as well as its disciplinary effect on analyst behavior. An analyst’s ranking in
the Institutional Investor annual poll is significantly associated with his/her
compensation and his/her job security (Stickel, 1992). Therefore, the All-American
analysts are concerned about maintaining their reputation. All-star analysts are
quicker to downgrade their buy recommendations compared to their unranked peers.
All-star analysts’ forecasts remain accurate during hot markets while other analysts’
do not (Fang and Yasuda, 2006a, 2006b). Clarke, Khorana, Patel and Rau (2007) also
find that all-star analysts that switch their employers do not change their optimism in
earnings forecasts and recommendations although they do revise their coverage
decisions.
Institutional investors may moderate analysts’ conflicts of interests for the
following two reasons. Firstly, the trading commissions from institutional investors
are an important source of income of analysts’ employers. The quality of stock
research is an important factor when institutional investors allocate trading
commissions among brokers. Moreover, institutional investors determine analyst
career prospects through voting in the Institutional Investor annual poll. Therefore
analysts are responsive to the needs of institutional investors. Ljungqvist, Marston,
Starks, Wei and Yan (2007) find that institutional ownership of stocks determines
analyst coverage decisions and moderates analyst optimism relative to market
consensus. Analysts also strive for higher forecast accuracy and downgrade
11

recommendations more quickly to bad news on stocks with higher institutional
ownership.
What is more, the labor market also disciplines analyst bias. Research shows
that more accurate analysts are better rewarded by the labor market. Mikhail, Walther
and Willis (1999) show that an analyst who is less accurate than his/ her peers is
more likely to be replaced in spite of the profitability of his/her recommendations.
Hong and Kubik (2003) find that analysts that are more accurate have higher
likelihoods to move to prestigious investment banks.
Financial institutions themselves have incentives to moderate the conflicts of
interests faced by their analysts. Even if the buyer is at an information disadvantage
in a financial transaction, he/she will not be hurt as long as both parties to the
transaction form their expectations rationally. The buyer will enter into the
transaction only when the price of the good is favorable enough to cover any losses
that may arise from potential conflicts of interests. Thus, the seller (financial
institution) bears the cost of any conflicts of interests and therefore has the incentive
to reduce the impact of the conflicts of interests to maximize the selling price.
Jacob, Rock and Weber (2003) find that forecasts of quarterly earnings, annual
earnings and long-term growth by investment bank analysts are more accurate and
less optimistic than those from analysts of independent research firms. Clarke,
Khorana, Patel and Rau (2004) also find that analysts’ at large investment banks
provide less optimistic and more accurate earnings forecasts, and are more likely to
provide the first forecast for a firm in any given quarter. Abnormal returns following
recommendations from these large investment banks are also higher than those
following the advice of other financial institutions. Analysts do not change their
optimism when moving to large investment banks.

2.3 The impacts of conflicts of interests on customers of analyst reports

Even if the aforementioned moderating mechanisms fail to function and analysts
12

decide to issue biased or fraudulent reports, customers are not necessarily hurt by
those biased reports as long as they form their expectations rationally. The customers
will discount the quality of those reports to make sure that they are not harmed by the
potential conflicts of interests.
There are many empirical studies that examine whether conflicted analyst
reports are inaccurate, and whether customers realize the conflicts of interests in
analyst report and discount the credibility of them. Firstly, some papers compare the
returns from acting on conflicted analysts’ reports versus the returns from acting on
independent analysts’ reports. For example, Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) find
that post-offering underperformance is most pronounced for firms with the highest
growth forecasts made by affiliated analysts. Barber, Lehavy and Truman (2007) find
that following buy recommendations from independent analysts generate higher
abnormal returns compared with following buy recommendations from investment
bank analysts. This difference is more pronounced after the NASDAQ peaked and
for firms with recent equity offerings. Meanwhile, sell ratings from investment banks
earn more abnormal stock returns than sell ratings from independent research firms.
However, other studies fail to find differences in abnormal returns from strategies
that follow analyst reports from investment banks and those that follow analyst
reports from other financial institutions (Clarke, Khorana, Patel and Rau, 2004).
Some other studies concentrate on the market reaction to potentially conflicted
analyst reports and to independent analyst reports. Lin and McNichols (1998) study a
sample of stocks with seasoned offerings and find that hold recommendations from
affiliated analysts are more informative than holds from other analysts. In particular,
they show that investors treat affiliated analysts’ hold recommendations as sells.
Agrawal and Chen (2008) also find that the capital market discounts optimistic bias.
On the other hand, Michaely and Womack (1999) find that investors only partially
discount the recommendations by affiliated analysts and stock prices do not react as
much to buy recommendations issued by underwriter analysts (analysts working for
an underwriting bank) compared to non-underwriter analysts.
13

Evidence of analysts maintaining buy recommendations even after the stock
prospects appear to deteriorate is often viewed as proof of conflicts of interests in
analyst reports. For example, O’Brien, McNichols and Lin (2005) find that affiliated
analysts downgrade their recommendations from a buy rating more slowly than
independent analysts after equity offerings. However, Ljungqvist et al. (2007) find
that analysts’ responsiveness to bad news is unrelated to the strength of existing
investment banking relationships.
The mixed empirical evidence is due in part to the difficulty in discovering
conflicts of interests in analyst reports that vary across investor types. Institutional
investors generally have cheaper ways to monitor the quality of analysts’ services
than retail investors, and they are more capable of disciplining the dishonest behavior
of analysts compared with retail investors. Correspondingly, Malmendier and
Shanthikumar (2007) find that large investors react to strong buy recommendations
but not to buy recommendations, and they sell on hold recommendations. Small
investors follow the recommendations literally. Also large investors discount
recommendations from affiliated analysts while small investors fail to adjust for the
distorted incentives of analysts. They also find that there is little evidence of
differences in stock returns from investment strategies that follow recommendations
from affiliated analysts versus those that follow unaffiliated recommendations.

2.4 Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the extant research identifies several sources of conflicts of
interests facing a typical analyst working for full-service brokerage firm. An analyst
working for full-service brokerage house is pressured by its investment banking
department to issue flattering reports on the existing or potential investment banking
clients; is pressured by brokerage department to issue optimistic reports to boost
trading volume; and is pressured by his/ her in-house asset management department
to prop up its performance. However, the reputation concerns of analysts and their
14

employers discipline conflicts of interests. The labor market also plays an important
role in containing conflicting reports. Large investors are more capable of protecting
themselves from conflicts of interests in analyst reports than small investors.
However, the mixed empirical evidence on the existence of conflicts of interests and
their impacts on their clients suggest that there might be other underlying factors or
influences facing a typical equity analyst. For example, institutional investors play a
role in shaping analyst upward biased reports, as the trading commission from them
is a source of stable income. Institutional investors’ opinions and votes in the
Institutional Investor annual poll is a clear metric of analyst performance and thus
helps determine analyst career prospects.
Most of the published research to date relies on U.S. data and institutions. The
purpose of my research is to extend this line of enquiry to China, a country with a
fast developing financial infrastructure. In particular, my thesis empirically examines
the impact of mutual fund clients’ shareholdings on analyst’s upward bias.

My

study contributes to the literature on conflicts of interests in financial industry by
discovering another important source of conflict of interest that is omnipresent in the
equity research industry.
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Chapter 3. The development of China’s mutual funds and brokerage firms

In order to help stabilize the stock markets and strengthen corporate governance
the government made a strategic decision in year 2000 to develop securities mutual
funds as institutional investors in tradable shares (China Securities Regulatory
Commission, 2000).5 Since then, the mutual fund industry has grown dramatically.
In 2002 and 2004, the National Council for Social Security Fund designated six and
four mutual fund families, respectively, to manage the national security fund. This
policy further boosts the mutual fund industry. As shown in Table1A, the number of
mutual funds increased from 34 in 2000 to 368 in 2007. These funds are managed by
60 mutual fund families (named Fund Management Companies in China). The
aggregate net asset value has grown from 84.56 billion RMB in 2000 to 3275.40
billion RMB seven years later. A few large fund families dominate China’s mutual
fund industry. As shown in Table1A, the total assets under management of the five
largest mutual fund families in 2007 accounts for about 32% of total tradable shares
held by the entire mutual fund industry6.
The mutual fund industry in China draws its inspiration from, and is organized
along the lines of, mutual funds in the U.S. and other developed countries. They
make their money from differences between the buying and selling prices of the fund
units as well as from a management fee based on the total value of the fund. The
mutual fund families advertise extensively for new unit holders and emphasize the
performance of their funds. Competition is very fierce and so mutual fund managers
are under pressure to improve investment returns. Many fund houses have their own
research departments that search for undervalued securities. Thus, mutual funds are
not entirely dependent on brokerage analysts for investment advice.
5

The rules governing mutual funds are codified in the Securities Investment Fund Law of 2003.
China’s stocks are divided into tradable shares and non-tradable shares. While the former can be held by all
investors and can be traded freely on the stock exchanges, the latter are exclusively held by the government and
its designated agencies and generally cannot be traded on the stock exchanges. In 2005/6, a share reform program
was implemented where all shares are to be made tradable after a lock up period expires (Firth, Lin and Zou,
2009a). The lock up period ends in 2008 or 2009.
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[TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1B presents a summary of the revenues and income of China’s brokerage
firms from 2002 to 2007. Prior to 2006, most brokerage firms in China suffered
losses because of the poor performances of their proprietary investments in the stock
market. In year 2005 there was a major reorganization of China’s brokerage firm
industry, which included a merger and acquisition wave among existing firms,
bankruptcies of some financially unviable firms, and the entry of some new firms. In
2007, the brokerage firms reported significant earnings that exceeded 141 billion
RMB. There are 66 full-service brokerage firms which offer both underwriting and
brokerage services (they are the counterparts of investment banks in U.S.).
A major feature of China’s brokerage industry is the substantial proportion of
trading commissions in a brokerage firm’s total revenue. During 2002 to 2007, the
annual trading commission accounts for more than 51% of brokerage firms’ total
annual revenue, while the security underwriting fees contribute, on average, less than
5% of total revenue. Commissions paid by institutional investors are a relatively
constant source of income compared to the commissions from retail investors, which
are highly volatile in China 7.
Many brokerages employ investment analysts to carry out research on stocks
and make recommendations on what to buy and, occasionally, what to sell. The
analysts’ reports are sent to existing and potential institutional clients as well as to
individual investors. Summary recommendations are often disclosed on web-sites
and in financial newsletters and newspapers. Analysts’ recommendations are
therefore widely circulated and are effectively in the public domain. Thus, they can
influence the investment decisions of many investors.
Periodically, mutual fund families poll their fund managers to help them decide
how to allocate trading commissions among brokerage firms.

This leads to

allocations being based, in part, on which sell-side analyst provides more
“supportive” research (i.e., that supports the mutual funds’ existing stock holdings).
7

The analysis in this section comes from an article by Xin Jiang in the China Security Journal entitled “Fierce
competition for commission from the mutual fund industry”, September 6, 2008 (in Chinese).
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Because commissions are so important to the brokerage firm, and hence an analyst’s
compensation, the analysts have strong economic incentives to make buy or strong
buy recommendations on the stocks that are held by mutual fund clients and to resist
making negative recommendations. An analyst’s optimism on a specific stock will be
positively related to the weight that stock has in the mutual funds’ portfolios. Analyst
optimism increases as the trading commissions paid by their mutual fund clients
increases.
Many listed firms in China are controlled or owned by the government. The
analysts might succumb to political pressure to bias positively their recommendations

on the state owned listed firms. This effect is likely to be stronger for analysts
employed by politically connected brokerage firms, where the CEOs of brokerage
firms are former government officials. The politically connected managers in these
brokerage firms will try to curry favor with the bureaucrats to gain political credits
and maximize their political career prospects (Firth et al., 2009a). I empirically test
this conjecture in my analysis.
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Chapter 4. Empirical Analysis on Mutual Fund Relationships and Analyst
Recommendations

4.1 Introduction

In a recent paper, Mola and Guidolin (2009) identify a source of conflict that
can arise in financial services firms that house mutual fund operations as well as
brokerage units. They find that brokerage analysts in the U.S. upgrade their
recommendations on stocks owned by mutual funds that are part of the same
full-service financial group (these are termed affiliated mutual funds). Mola and
Guidolin argue that the analysts are under pressure to recommend these stocks to
improve the affiliated mutual fund performance.
This study extends the research of Mola and Guidolin to cases where
brokerages and mutual funds do not have a common ownership. In particular, I
examine how the business relations between a brokerage and an independently
owned mutual fund might impact on analysts’ investment recommendations. I argue
that a broker has incentives to issue positively biased investment recommendations
on those stocks already held by its mutual fund clients in order to prop up (or not to
hurt) the performance of these institutional clients and thus earn more business
(mainly in terms of trading commission) from them.
I organize the remainder of the Chapter as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
sample and data used in this study. Section 4.3 to Section 4.8 discusses the empirical
results.
4.2 Sample and data

The data used in this study are mainly from two large databases: the I/B/E/S
database of research analyst recommendations and the WIND Financial Database.
The sample period is from the first quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2008.
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WIND is the leading integrated financial service platform of market quotes and
financial data in China. It is widely used by academics and the finance industry. I
focus on 2004-2008 for the following two reasons: firstly, WIND begins tracking
analyst recommendations from 2004. Secondly, this period includes China’s
record-breaking bull market period (from June 6th, 2005 to October 16th, 2007) as
well as the subsequent drastic stock market correction. The sample period allows me
to examine the analyst behavior in two distinct market conditions, a bull market and
a bear market. Table 2 presents definitions of the variables used in this study.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
4.2.1 Measures of analyst optimism

I obtain international investment banks’ (e.g., Goldman Sachs, UBS) research
analyst recommendations on China’s stocks (both A share and B share 8) from I/B/E/S.
Analyst recommendations from domestic brokerage firms (such as CITIC Security
Co. Ltd) are extracted from the WIND Financial Database. WIND records analyst
recommendations in an identical way to I/B/E/S9. Each recommendation enters into
WIND in real-time sequence with standardized five digit ratings identical to I/B/E/S.
I reverse the rating codes in this study, so that 1 denotes a “sell” rating while 5
denotes a “strong buy”.
I use a relative recommendation to measure an analyst’s optimism. Here, I
follow Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and take the individual investment recommendation
featured in an analyst’s report (strong buy, buy, hold, under perform and sell) and
subtract the market consensus (the mean investment ratings of all the analysts
covering the same stock in the same quarter). Table 3A presents the summary
statistics across years. My sample consists of 18,790 analyst recommendations issued
8

The stocks listed in China are categorized into A shares and B shares. A shares are traded in RMB and the A
share market is open to all domestic investors and qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII). B shares are
traded in either U.S. dollars or Hong Kong dollars and the B share market was initially exclusive to foreign
investors. Although China recently opened its B share market to domestic investors, there is relatively little
trading as the investors do not have access to foreign currencies (U.S. and Hong Kong dollars).
9
WIND also has earnings forecast data but the coverage is quite limited. I therefore limit myself to analyses of
investment recommendations. Previous studies document the advantage of using relative investment ratings
rather than earnings forecasts to measure analysts’ optimism (Ljungqvist et al., 2007).
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by 1,613 analysts from 59 full-service brokerage firms on 1,354 stocks listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to the first half of 2008. As
shown in Table 3A, the “strong buy” and “buy” recommendations are much more
common than the other three investment ratings during my sample period. More than
70% of recommendations are rated as “strong buy” or “buy”, while “under perform”
and “sell” ratings account for only about 4% percent of the sample recommendations.
The large growth in mutual funds and the prohibition of short selling in China may
contribute to the preponderance of buy recommendations. Analysts also tend to make
favorable investment recommendations in the U.S. (e.g., Mola and Guidolin, 2009).
Both the number of “buy” and “strong buy” recommendations and the market
consensus recommendation have increased throughout the sample years, indicating
that analyst optimism has grown regardless of market condition. As indicated in
Table 3B, my sample includes a majority (87.22% and 80.60%, respectively) of the A
shares listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Analysts tend to
neglect most of the B shares because of the relatively small investor pool and low
turnover rate in the B share market. Stocks in the manufacturing and mining industry
receive disproportionately more analyst coverage, followed by stocks in the financial
and property sectors. Specifically, recommendations on manufacturing and mining
stocks and on finance and property stocks account for 60% and 11%, respectively, of
total observations. Such preferences toward specific industries suggest that analysts
are strategic in choosing which stocks to cover (for similar evidence in the U.S., see
McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Ljungvist et al., 2007). As indicated in Table 3B,
27.13% of recommendations in my sample are of state-owned shares covered by
politically connected analysts.
[TABLE 3 HERE]

4.2.2 Mutual fund clients’ pressure

WIND has an institutional shareholding database and a database covering
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details on commission payments made by each mutual fund to individual brokerage
firms, constructed from the mutual funds’ quarterly reports and half-year reports,
respectively. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC, hereafter)
requires each mutual fund to report its stockholdings in its quarterly report.
According to the CSRC, each mutual fund must disclose details of their trading
commission payments in its half-year report, including the total amount of stock
trading commission and the distribution of the commission among brokerage firms.
I focus my tests on how the business relations between brokerage firms and
their mutual fund clients have an impact on analyst optimism. A mutual fund is
regarded as a client of analyst i’s brokerage firm if it reports commission payments to
i’s brokerage firm in the most recent half-year report. An analyst i from brokerage
firm b covering stock j is considered to be subject to pressure from b’s mutual fund
clients if at least one of the mutual fund clients already hold stock j in its portfolio.
For an analyst i working for brokerage firm b covering stock j in quarter t, I use two
variables to measure the strength of the impact of broker-mutual fund business
relation on analyst optimism (relative to market consensus). My first variable, related
holding, is stock j’s weight in the aggregate portfolio of brokerage firm b’s mutual
fund clients 10 in quarter t-1. This measures the importance of stock j for the mutual
fund clients. The variable is lagged one quarter to ensure that the mutual fund clients’
investment size in stock j affects recommendations assigned by analyst i, not the
reverse. My second variable, commission, is the commission payments made by
mutual fund clients that already hold stock j covered by brokerage firm b as a
proportion of the total trading commission revenue from the mutual fund industry
paid to brokerage firm b. This variable is measured on a half-year basis and is lagged
one half-year to exclude the potential reverse causality problem. This measurement
captures the economic importance of those mutual fund clients to brokerage firm b.
As shown in Table 4, the recommendations issued by analysts on stocks already held
10

To construct the variable related holding, firstly I aggregate the market values of stock j held by every mutual
fund client of brokerage firm b at the end of quarter t-1. This aggregate market value of stock j constructed in the
first step is then divided by the total net asset value of all of b’s mutual fund clients that held stock j at the end of
quarter t-1.
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by their brokerage firms’ mutual fund clients (relation dummy) comprise 38% of the
total recommendations in my sample. For those mutual fund clients that already hold
the stocks when the analyst issues the recommendation on those stocks, the stocks
account for 2.15% of their total portfolios on average.
[TABLE 4 HERE]

4.2.3 Political pressure

For an analyst i employed by brokerage firm b covering stock j in quarter t, I
say that analyst i is under political pressure to inflate his/her investment ratings on
stock j if 1) the CEO of brokerage firm b was a government official or a military
officer before taking the position in the brokerage firm; and 2) government agencies
own the shares of stock j. In order to capture the political pressure defined above, I
construct a product of two variables. One is a dummy variable CEO political dummy,
which is equal to one if the CEO of brokerage firm b was a government official or a
military officer before taking the position in the brokerage firm, and zero otherwise 11.
This dummy variable captures the connection between the brokerage firm and
government. The other variable is State own, which is percent of shares held by
various levels of governments and their agencies at the time the recommendation is
issued. The variable CEO_political× Stateown is a product of CEO political dummy
and State own. I manually collect brokerage firms’ CEO political status data from the
websites of brokerage firms. The state ownership data are available in the WIND
Financial Database. Recommendations from politically connected brokerage firms
comprise 43% of the total recommendations. The average state ownership of public
listed companies is 27%.
4.2.4 Investment banking pressure

Previous studies indicate that investment bankers often pressure their in-house
11

This definition is similar to Firth et al.’s (2009a) definition of the political connections of China’s public-listed
companies.
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research departments to issue more optimistic reports on the stocks of their current or
potential clients (e.g., Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely
and Womack, 1999; Ljungvist et al., 2007). Therefore, I introduce a dummy variable
to control for the potential preexisting investment bank relationship between analyst
i’s brokerage firm and stock j. For an analyst i employed by brokerage firm b
covering stock j in quarter t, the dummy variable I-bank relation dummy is equal to
one if the investment banking department of brokerage firm b served as a lead or
co-lead manager in j’s most recent seasoned-equity offering or debt issue prior to the
recommendation being issued, or, if there is no seasoned-equity offering or debt issue,
it is equal to one if brokerage firm b’s investment banking department was a lead or
co-lead underwriter at the time of j’s initial public offering. A business relationship
between the issuer and non-managing member of the underwriting syndicate is
assumed to be weak (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara,
2000; Corwin and Schultz, 2005). Only 750 recommendations are issued by analysts
subject to investment banking pressure, representing approximately 4% of total
recommendations.

4.2.5 Company characteristics

I control for several firm characteristics. First, previous research studies (e.g.,
Ljungqvist et al., 2007; Mola and Guidolin, 2009) find that analysts are less likely to
give in to investment banking or brokerage pressure when the stock is highly visible
to institutional investors. To control for this potential effect, I follow Mola and
Guidolin (2009) and use the variable other fund own, which is the number of the
shares held by the other mutual funds (i.e., other than the brokerage firm b’s clients
at the end of quarter t-1) divided by the total shares outstanding. This is a proxy for
other institutional shareholdings in a publicly listed company 12. Second, most listed
12

There exist other institutional investors in China’s stock market, for example, insurance company, social
security funds. However, these institutions have only recently been allowed to participate in stock market. I
cannot get sufficient reliable data from my data sources. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) are
allowed to participate in China’s A-share market in late 2002. These foreign investors may impact analyst
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companies in China suffer from information opaqueness although companies that list
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, foreign stock exchange, or the B share market,
which are open mainly to foreign investors, have a better information environment.
The information environment of a firm is a deterministic factor of the analyst
coverage decision and influences the accuracy of an analyst’s report on that firm
(Hope, 2003). Therefore, I calculate a dummy variable (oversea list dummy) which is
equal to one if a firm has shares traded on an overseas stock exchange (including the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange) or China B share market when the recommendation is
issued, and zero otherwise. Table 4 shows that 15% of my sample recommendations
are on stocks that have a foreign listing (including a B-share listing). Third, I use the
most recent quarter-end proxy for Tobin’s Q (Q), return on assets (ROA)13, and
revenue-to-asset ratio (revenue) to capture a firm’s growth prospects, profitability,
and efficiency, respectively. Market-to-book ratio is defined as the sum of the market
value of equity and book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets.
Return on assets is the quarterly earnings before interest and tax divided by total
assets. Revenue-to-asset ratio is the total operational revenue scaled by total assets. I
also calculate the dividend yield (div yield), which is the quarterly dividend per share
divided by the share price at the end of the quarter. Log form of total assets (firm size)
controls for the firm size. Each variable is lagged one quarter. Firm performance and
firm size data are from the WIND Financial Database.

4.2.6 Brokerage firm characteristics

Studies in the U.S. suggest that prestigious investment banks are less likely to
risk their reputation capital by pressuring their analysts to issue bullish reports
(Ljungvist, Marston and Wilhelm, 2006). I therefore argue that analysts from
internationally renowned investment banks care more about their ethical behavior
coverage decisions as well as analyst bias. Unfortunately, I am unable to find reliable data on the stockholdings of
QFIIs. . I appreciate that one anonymous examiner raise these concerns.
13
I use EBIT divided by total assets to calculate return on assets. Other studies use net income divided by total
assets. The choice of numerator does not alter the qualitative results in this study.
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and reputations than domestic brokerage firms do and therefore should be more
conservative in their investment ratings. As a result, I use a dummy variable (foreign
broker dummy) which is equal to one if the headquarter of the analyst’s brokerage
firm is located overseas, and zero otherwise. According to this criterion, 4% of my
sample recommendations are issued by analysts from foreign-based brokerage firms
(see Table 4). As another proxy for reputation I use the years (broker experience)
since the brokerage firm was first established in China as a control for reputation.
Some U.S. studies use the investment bank’s share of the IPO underwriting market in
previous years as a proxy for reputation (e.g., Ljungqvist et al., 2007). I do not use
this proxy in my study because the international investment banks do not directly
participate in China’s domestic IPO market 14.

4.2.7 Analyst characteristics

I also control for several analyst characteristics. First, I include an all-star
analyst dummy. Mola and Guidolin (2009) find that all-star analysts are associated
with more optimistic ratings. Furthermore, Hong and Kubik (2003) find that
brokerage firms are likely to reward those analysts who promote stocks with ratings
bolder than the consensus forecast. In this study, I use rankings from the New
Fortune Chinese Best Analysts survey. This survey is China’s counterpart of the U.S.
Institutional Investor survey and is conducted over a large number of buy-side
institutions (mainly mutual fund managers) every year. For an analyst i covering a
stock j at quarter t, I define the analyst i as an all-star analyst (all star dummy) if i
ranks in the top three of all the analysts covering stock j’s industry according to the
14
The Administration Measures of Securities Issuance and Underwriting set an entry barrier for new participants
and foreign participants in the domestic equity offering underwriting market. Three foreign investment banks
have set up joint ventures: Gaohua-Goldman Sachs (specific ownership information is not publicly available),
CICC (in which Morgan Stanley has a 34.3% ownership), and UBS Security Co Ltd.(in which UBS has a 30%
ownership). According to the Security Association of China, the above three security companies only account for
1.46%, 10.31% and 2.3% of the total security underwriting revenue, respectively, in the past six years. All the
other foreign investment banks have never been lead or co-lead underwriters.
Weblink:
http://www.sac.net.cn/newcn/home/info_detail.jsp?info_id=1236073459100&info_type=CMS.STD&cate_id=811
83692051100
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most recent New Fortune Chinese Best Analysts survey. All-star analysts issue about
13% of my sample recommendations.
My second variable (productivity) is the number of reports issued by analyst i as
a proportion of the total number of analyst reports issued by the brokerage firm that i
works for in the year when the recommendation is issued. This variable measures an
analyst’s productivity and importance in his/her research department. The mean
productivity is 8%.
My third variable is the number of industries (industry coverage) that the
analyst covers in the year when the recommendation is issued. On average, an
individual analyst covers 2.56 2-digit CSRC industry sectors (median = 2). My last
variable (seniority) is the number of quarters since the analyst first showed up in the
two databases. Hong et al. (2000) find that analysts in the U.S. are less bold early in
their careers. Previous studies suggest that an analyst’s experience has competing
impacts on analyst optimism. On one hand, analysts with more experience in an
industry are likely to develop superior private information that potentially reduces
the optimism in recommendations. On the other hand, analysts with longer
experience and a narrow focus are more likely to develop a good relationship with
the management, making it difficult for them to question objectively managers’
performances. This closeness to management can result in relatively optimistic
recommendations (Cowen et al., 2006). In my sample, seniority has a mean of 13.66
quarters15.

4.2.8 Other controls

I use log form of quarterly indices of the stock exchanges where the stock lists
(log quarter index) to control for market conditions. I also define coverage_no as the
log form of the number of analysts covering that stock (Ljungvist et al., 2007).
15
There are several other analyst characteristics, for example, gender and age, which may affect analyst behavior.
Unfortunately, we do not have biological information of individual analyst. I appreciate that one examiner brings
this suggestions to me.
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4.2.9 Company and analyst summary statistics

Table 5A reports the mean value of financial transparency, operational and
financial performance, size, and ownership structure for firms receiving optimistic
analyst coverage (relative to market consensus) and firms receiving equal-or-less
than market consensus recommendations. I use the two-tailed t-statistic to test the
significance of the differences in firm characteristics across these two subgroups.
18% of the covered firms that receive favorable analyst recommendations have their
shares listed on an overseas stock exchange as well as the domestic A share market.
In contrast, 13% of the covered firms that have neutral or negative relative analyst
recommendations have their shares listed on a foreign stock market. The one quarter
lagged ROA, proxy for Tobin’s Q and revenue scaled by total assets are also higher
for firms receiving optimistic recommendations than for firms receiving
non-optimistic recommendations. All the differences are significant at the 1%
significance level. These differences exist in both bull and bear markets. There is no
significant difference in state ownership between firms receiving optimistic
investment ratings and firms receiving non-optimistic investment ratings. In contrast,
there is weak evidence that more optimistic forecasts are given to stocks with higher
institutional share ownership. Overall, analysts tend to give recommendations that
are more favorable to firms that have a more transparent information environment,
higher profitability and efficiency, as well as better growth prospects.
In Table 5B, I compare the recommendations issued by analysts from
foreign-based brokerage firms against recommendations issued by analysts from
domestic brokerage firms, as well as all-star analyst recommendations and other
analyst recommendations. I find that the proportions of “strong buy” and “buy”
recommendations issued by analysts from foreign-based brokerage firms are
significantly lower than those recommendations issued by analysts from domestic
brokerage firms. This difference confirms my earlier conjecture that analysts from
internationally renowned brokerage firms make recommendations that are more
conservative because they are more concerned with their reputation capital.
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Interestingly, all-star analysts are more optimistic than ordinary analysts are in terms
of the proportion of “strong buy” ratings and for the average ratings and for the
average ratings relative to market consensus. Thus, the designation of a coveted
all-star ranking is associated with more optimistic recommendations.
[TABLE 5 HERE]

4.3 Mutual fund pressure and political pressure on analyst recommendations
4.3.1 Univariate analysis

Table 6A provides univariate analyses on the impact of the stockholdings of
mutual fund clients on analyst optimism over the whole sample period and in bull
and bear market periods 16. For an analyst i employed by brokerage firm b covering
stock j in quarter t, portfolio weight is defined as the per cent weight of stock j in the
mutual fund clients’ portfolios at the end of quarter t-1. During my sample period,
the median value of portfolio weight is 0.81%. Analysts are more optimistic (both in
absolute levels and relative levels to market consensus) toward stocks that are held
more heavily by their mutual fund clients. From the first tercile (low portfolio weight)
to the third tercile (high portfolio weight), the average analyst investment rating
increases from 3.98 to 4.27, and the average analyst optimism relative to market
consensus increases from less optimistic than market consensus (-0.08) in the first
tercile to more optimistic than market consensus (0.11) in the third tercile. I identify
a similar trend in the bear market period, while in the bull market period, the
difference in analyst optimism is not so apparent across the three terciles of portfolio
weights. Both the average recommendation and the average recommendation relative
to market consensus are statistically higher for analyst coverage on stocks held by
mutual fund clients than those for analyst coverage on stocks not held by mutual
fund clients (based on the two-tailed t-test). These differences exist in both bull
16

The bull market period lasts from June 6th, 2005 to October 16th, 2007. The rest of my sample period are bear
market periods.
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market and bear market periods. The evidence provides prima facie evidence in
support of my argument that analyst optimism is driven by the stock holdings of
brokerage firms’ mutual fund clients.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
Table 6B tests analyst optimism for politically connected brokerage firms on
state-owned shares. Analysts from politically connected brokerage firms are more
optimistic

about

state-owned

listed

shares

than

are

analysts

from

non-politically-connected brokerage firms, both in terms of average ratings and in
terms of average ratings relative to market consensus. Two-tailed t-tests confirm the
statistical significance of differences in optimism and this result holds both bull and
bear market periods. Overall, the univariate test results in Table 6B confirm my
argument that analysts from politically connected brokerage firms are under pressure
to issue more optimistic recommendations (than market consensus) on state-owned
shares.

4.3.2 Multivariate analysis

In this section, I conduct the multivariate analysis using the following empirical
model:
Fijt = C jt −1 + Bit + Ait + Rijt + ε ijt
Where Fijt is analyst i’s stock recommendations (relative to consensus) for
company j at time t. C jt −1 is the one quarter lagged vector of company
characteristics as described in section 4.2.5. Bit and Ait control for the brokerage
firm characteristics and analyst characteristics described in sections 4.2.6 and 4.2.7,
respectively. Rijt captures the strength of the pressures from mutual fund clients,
politically-connected brokerage firm CEOs and investment banking departments
(described in sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.4, respectively) when analyst i issues a
recommendation on stock j in quarter t .
The estimation model suggests a three dimensional panel set-up, which has
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variation in three dimensions: analyst i, stock j, and recommendation quarter t. The
unit of observation is an analyst i making a recommendation for company j in quarter
t. However, there is no standard routine for the estimation of three-dimensional panel
data17. I follow the literature (Ljungqvist et al., 2007) and estimate the model by
focusing on one of the two random effects at a time. Specifically, I first include
random analyst effects to remove the unobserved heterogeneity across different
analysts, while ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity across stocks. Then I include
random stock effects to remove the unobserved heterogeneity across stocks while
ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity across different analysts.
Table 7 presents my focal empirical results. In all columns, the dependent
variable is analyst recommendation relative to market consensus as defined in section
4.2.1. In columns 1 and 2, I only include one key variable-----the stock’s weight in
the portfolio of the mutual fund clients, which captures the impact of mutual fund
clients’ pressure on analyst optimism. Commission, the proportion of trading
commissions earned from the mutual funds that hold stock j (see section 4.2.2) enters
into the model in columns 3 and 4 as an additional proxy for the pressure from
mutual fund clients. The political pressure proxy enters into the regression in
columns 5 and 6. As a robustness check, the last column presents empirical results
from an ordered probit that models the three-level choice facing a typical analyst:
issuing an above, at, or below consensus report. In columns 1, 3 and 5, I estimate the
model using a panel GLS regression with random analyst effects. Columns 2, 4 and 6
report the empirical results with random stock effects.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
There are positive and statistically significant coefficients on related holding
and commission in all of my models. These results are consistent with my arguments.
Here, analysts are subjected to pressure or incentives from their brokerage firms to
inflate their recommendations on the stocks that are already held by the broker’s
mutual fund clients. The pressure increases as the stock’s weight in the mutual fund
17

Antweiler (2001) develops a random estimator for the special multi-dimensional panel in which the random
effects are nested. However, in my model, the panel dimensions are not nested.
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clients’ portfolios increase or as the commission payments earned from those mutual
fund clients that hold the stock increase (i.e., the commissions constitute a larger
portion of total stock trading commission income from all mutual funds).
Preexisting underwriting ties between the company and the analyst’s brokerage
firm are positively and significantly related to optimistic analyst behavior, as
indicated by the positive and significant coefficients on I-bank relation dummy. This
result confirms that the well-documented investment banking pressure on analyst
behavior in the U.S. also exists in China even though the underwriting fees constitute
a small amount of brokerage firms’ total revenues.
My proxy for the political pressure faced by analysts (Ceo_political×Stateown)
is significantly and positively related to analysts’ relative recommendations. The
politically connected CEOs from brokerage firms pressure their in-house analysts to
look more favorably (than market consensus) on firms that have high state ownership.
The coefficient on state ownership (State own) becomes negative and significant
when I include the political pressure variable in my regression. The negative and
significant coefficients on state ownership indicate that the analysts are reluctant to
make more favorable recommendations than market consensus on state controlled
stocks. However, this conservative approach toward state controlled listed firms is
modified if the CEO of the brokerage firm is politically connected to the government
or state. Taking together the signs on state ownership and the interactive term
between state ownership and the dummy for politically connected broker, we
conclude that apart from pressure from business ties between brokerage firms and
their mutual fund clients, analysts from politically connected brokerage firms bear
additional pressure to bias their reports upward for listed firms that have high state
ownership.
Some of the control variables are associated with analyst optimism. Analysts
employed by internationally renowned investment banks are more conservative in
issuing optimistic recommendations relative to market consensus, as indicated by the
negative and significant coefficients on foreign broker dummy. The coefficient on
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other fund own is negative and significant in most regressions, providing evidence
for the conjecture that the presence of other mutual funds holding the stock
moderates analyst optimism; a similar finding is also reported in the U.S. (Ljungqvist
et al., 2007)18. Consistent with Mola and Guidolin (2009) I also find that all-star
analysts issue more optimistic recommendations. Analysts at longer-established
brokerages give more optimistic stock recommendations. All-star analysts are also
likely to issue more aggressive reports 19.
4.4 Endogenous coverage selection

My results might be driven by the fact that analysts strategically choose which
stocks to cover. Previous research suggests that analysts selectively choose to publish
reports about stocks that are held primarily by institutional investors (O’Brien and
Bushman, 1990) and which they have positive views on (McNichols and O'Brien,
1997). Econometrically, this means that I observe a recommendation on a stock only
if the analyst thinks it worthwhile to cover the stock. I offer two robustness checks to
address this endogenous selection problem. Firstly, analysts usually have little
discretion with respect to covering large firms and so selection bias will be negligible
when I restrict my sample to relatively larger firms (Kolasinski and Kothari, 2007).
As indicated in the first two columns of Table 8, I obtain qualitatively similar results
when I restrict my sample to firms whose sizes are higher than the industry median
firm size.
[TABLE 8 HERE]
Secondly, I re-estimate my model using the Heckman selection model20 that

18
Due to the short history of China’s mutual fund industry, China’s mutual funds lack on efficient ways and
expertise to monitor conflicted behaviors in equity research industry compared to their US counterpart. The
coefficient on other fund own is less significant than that in US studies (e.g. Ljungqvist, et, al, 2007).
19
The coefficients on the All star dummy and Broker experience are positive and significant in columns 2, 4, and
6, but are not significant in columns 1, 3, and 5. The loss of significance could be driven by the inclusion of
analyst random effects in the three columns.
20
Recently, a few studies reveal the limitation of Heckman selection model in correcting self-selection bias. For
example, Clatworthy, Makepeace and Peel (2009) , as well as Francis and Lennox (2009), point out that Heckman
two-step estimates are highly sensitive to changes in sample and model specification, particularly the absense of a
valid instrumental variable. However, in this study, Heckman selection is practically feasible whereas other
self-selection models, such as propensity score matching model, are difficult or impossible to implement. I am
grateful for helpful comments from one examiner.
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ignores any random effects. It is computationally infeasible to use the Heckman
selection model in the presence of random effects because of my large sample size
when I include all the cases in which a given brokerage firm b could provide research
on stock j in a given quarter t. My procedure is as follows. I first create every
possible banking-stock quarter, whether or not an analyst in a given brokerage firm
covers a given stock in that quarter. Then I delete all the observations before a stock
first enters into my sample or after it permanently leaves the sample. This strategy
results in 514,729 possible bank-stock-quarter observations. The active coverage
observations comprise 18,790 bank-stock quarters (3.7% of all the potential
bank-stock quarters).
I use two instruments in my first step modeling of the analyst coverage decision.
Firstly, I follow Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and use the number of existing
recommendations from analyst i’s brokerage firm that cover stocks belonging to
stock j’s CSRC industry 21 as a proportion of the number of total existing
recommendations issued by that brokerage firm (broker industry cover). Ljungqvist
et al. (2006) and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) suggest that the broader the brokerage
firm’s existing coverage on firm j’s Fama and French three-factor industry (1997),
the lower the cost of covering firm j is. Therefore, the analysts in that brokerage firm
are more likely to cover stock j.
Secondly, I add a geographical coverage instrument. Using U.S. data, Malloy
(2005) finds that geographic location and proximity are important determinants of
the information advantages of some analysts over others. In China, regional
development is very unbalanced. Therefore, some brokerage firms may develop
information or expertise advantages in some specific regions and they are therefore
more likely to cover the firms in those regions. Following this rationale, I argue that
the broader the brokerage firm’s existing coverage of the region in which firm j’s
headquarter is located, the more expertise and knowledge the brokerage firm has and

21
The CSRC industry classification incorporates several international classification methodologies, including
CUSIP, SIC and Fama-French Industry classification (see the Guidelines of Industrial Classification on China’s
Listed Companies, 2001, published by the CSRC).
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its analysts are more likely to initiate coverage of the firms in the same location.
Therefore,

my second

instrumental variable

is the number

of existing

recommendations from analyst i’s brokerage firm that cover firms whose
headquarters are in the same location as stock j as a proportion of the number of total
existing recommendations issued by that brokerage firm (broker region cover).
Location is defined by major city (Beijing, Shanghai) and province.
The last four columns of Table 8 present the results. The inverse Mill’s Lambda
are statistically significant at the 5% level or less, confirming the existence of
selection bias.

The positive and significant coefficients on the two instruments

confirm that analysts are more likely to cover a stock if more stocks in the same
industry and same location are already covered by the analysts’ research departments.
Furthermore, the probability that an analyst will cover a stock increases with the size
of that stock in the portfolios of the mutual fund clients. This result further
corroborates my initial finding that analysts have incentives to cater to the needs of
their business-related mutual funds. Analysts from politically connected brokerage
firms are inclined to publish reports on state-owned stocks.

Not surprisingly, stocks

of large firms (in terms of total assets) receive disproportionately more analyst
coverage (Hayes, 1998). Moreover, the firms that are more profitable and more
efficient also receive more analyst coverage. The evidence shows that analysts
strategically select which stocks to cover. Analysts from internationally renowned
brokerage firms issue research reports less frequently.
The results in the second step in Table 8 mirror the results in Table 7. The
coefficients on pressure from mutual fund clients (related holding and commission),
political pressure (Ceo_political×Stateown) and investment banking pressure (I-bank
relation dummy) are positive and significant, with similar statistical significance
levels as the corresponding coefficients in Table 7. The other control variables also
yield similar results.

35

4.5 The composition of mutual fund clients

So far, I have shown that the stockholdings of mutual fund clients help
determine analyst optimism. However, the characteristics of mutual fund clients vary
across brokerage firms, for example, the size of the individual mutual fund client
itself. This variation implies that I can gain further insights into the effect of mutual
fund clients’ stockholdings on analyst optimism by considering the size of the mutual
fund clients. It is plausible that larger mutual fund clients are more influential for the
following two reasons. Firstly, mutual fund size is correlated with the potential
commissions that the mutual fund can allocate among brokerage firms. Secondly, the
size of assets under management of a mutual fund investor determines the weighting
the mutual fund investor has when voting in the New Fortune Chinese Best Analysts
survey.
To examine the client-size hypothesis, for an analyst i working for brokerage
firm b covering stock j in quarter t, I first identify the largest mutual funds (top 20%)
in terms of total equity value under management at the most recent year end. Then I
construct two variables to decompose the aggregate level of stockholding by b’s
mutual fund clients: large related holding, which captures the weight of stock j in the
aggregate portfolio of b’s large mutual fund clients; and small related holding, which
is the weight of stock j in the portfolio of b’s other mutual fund clients 22.
I re-estimate the random effects model in the first four columns in Table 7, using
the large related holding and small related holding instead of the aggregate weight of
covered stock in mutual fund clients’ portfolios. As indicated in Table 9, the
coefficient of large related holding is positive and statistically significant at the 1%
significance level, while the coefficient on small related holding is statistically
insignificant (except in column 2 where the coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level).
This result is robust when I incorporate commission into my model in the last four
columns. Analysts care mainly about the stockholdings of large mutual fund clients
22

The detailed construction of these two variables is similar to the construction of the variable related holding in
section 3.2.
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and tend to make bolder recommendations on the stocks heavily held by big mutual
fund clients in order to maintain good relationships with them.
[TABLE 9 HERE]

4.6 Mutual fund reactions to the recommendations

Anecdotal evidence in the U.S. suggests that the mutual funds can benefit from
upward-biased analyst reports by divesting their positions on stocks that are touted
by their affiliated analysts (e.g., Morgenson, 2001). To gain some further insight into
the benefit that accrues to mutual fund clients from analyst optimism on their large
stockholdings, I estimate a fixed effects panel regression model in which the change
in weight of the stock in mutual fund clients’ portfolios (between the end of quarter t
and the end of quarter t-1) is explained by a number of variables, including a dummy
for analyst optimism relative to market consensus.
As indicated in Table 10, the coefficients of both one quarter lagged analyst
optimism and current analyst optimism are negative and significant, indicating that
both the past and present analyst optimism on the stock are negatively related to
changes in the weight of that stock in mutual fund clients’ portfolios. A strong buy or
buy recommendation will likely boost a stock’s price, other things being equal. If the
mutual funds believe the stock price of a specific analyst-recommended share is
pumped too high they will sell that share to realize a gain. Thus the mutual fund
benefits if the analyst at the brokerage they do business with makes a biased
recommendation and the brokerage benefits from the business it does with the
mutual fund. Such stock price manipulation is also prevalent in other emerging
markets (e.g., Khwaja and Mian, 2005b).
[TABLE 10 HERE]
Changes in other mutual fund holdings of the stock and changes in the number
of other mutual funds that hold the stock are significantly and positively related to
the change in the stock’s weight in the mutual fund clients’ portfolios, which is
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consistent with Mola and Guidolin’s (2009) finding. Mutual fund clients also
increase their exposure to a company’s stock when the operational performance,
dividend yield and market price of the company improve and when the market index
increases.
My results help to allay concerns of reverse causality, where positive investment
recommendations drive stock purchases by the mutual funds. I find the opposite.
Mutual funds actually reduce their holdings of stocks that receive favorable
recommendations from business-related analysts. This gives us confidence that the
stockholdings of mutual funds influence analysts’ recommendations and not
vice-versa 23.

4.7 Bull and Bear market analysis on analyst optimism

In this section, I focus on testing whether the pressures from institutional clients
and from the government affect analysts’ behavior differently in bull market and bear
market periods. As described previously, I define the bull market period as June 6th
2005 to October 16th 2007, and the rest of my sample period is defined as a bear
market 24. I do a split-sample analysis according to the market condition. I estimate
the model in the same way as described in Section 4.3.2.
Table 11 presents the regression results. Columns 1 and 3 present the regression
results with panel analyst random effects while columns 2 and 4 present the
regression results with panel stock random effects. Columns 1 and 2 show the results
when I only include the recommendations issued during the bear market period. The
last two columns present the results when I restrict my sample to the bull market
period. The coefficients on related holding and commission are positive and
significant in all columns. However, the coefficients on Ceo_political×Stateown are
23

In Table 7 I address this issue by using lagged related holding. The implications from Table 8 are consistent
with those from Table 7.
24
This classification is widely acknowledged in the financial community. During the bull market period, the
Shanghai Composite Stock Index surged from 1,100 points to over 6,000 points. During the bear market period
that began in October 2007, the same index plunged from over 6,000 points to slightly higher than 2,000 points
and has remained low since that time.
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only positive and significant during the bear market period, indicating that political
pressure is stronger during a bear market period. The government may ask its former
employees, who are now CEOs in the brokerage firms, to impose more pressure on
their analysts to inflate their recommendations on the stocks of state-owned
companies in an attempt to preserve corporate values during market downturns. All
the signs and significance levels of the other variables are qualitatively unchanged. In
sum, the split-sample analysis indicates that analysts recommend stocks held by
mutual fund clients in order to win the lucrative trading commission allotment from
mutual funds regardless of market conditions. What is more, my analysis suggests
that political pressure is used as a type of corporate bailout by the government when
the economy is poor. This is similar in spirit to other bailout strategies documented in
the literature, such as easy access to external financing for politically connected firms
during financial crises (Faccio et al., 2006).

4.8 Stock returns associated with Analyst Optimism
4.8.1 Short-term stock returns associated with Analyst Optimism

In this section, I compare the 3-day market reaction to analyst recommendations
on stocks that mutual fund clients already hold and recommendations on stocks that
mutual fund clients do not hold. Day zero represents the analyst recommendation
date. I use the standard market model (Sharpe, 1963) to compute the abnormal
returns. The estimation period is from day -126 to day -7 before the analyst
recommendation and the market index is the equally weighted returns on all stocks
on the Shanghai or Shenzhen index (stock j is listed on either the Shanghai or the
Shenzhen stock exchange). I categorize the mean 3-day abnormal return by the
optimism of analyst coverage relative to market consensus and by the
recommendation rating.
Table 12A shows that optimistic fund-related stock recommendations generate a
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statistically significant (p<.01) positive return of 0.57%. Thus, the mutual fund client
benefits from the favorable recommendations as the value of their portfolios increase.
The positive performance is most pronounced for “strong buy” and “buy”
recommendations. A negative stock return, -0.34%, is observed for sell
recommendations. In sum, the recommendations have a positive effect on stock
prices. Table 12A also shows that the returns for independent stock recommendations
are significantly greater than for fund-related recommendations (for strong buy and
buy). This implies that investors are able to recognize the optimistic bias in
business-related analyst recommendations and discount the stock prices.
[TABLE 12 HERE]

4.8.2 Long-term stock returns associated with Analyst Optimism

I also examine the long run returns that accrue to investors acting on the
investment recommendations. In particular, for every recommendation in my sample,
I systematically act upon each recommendation by buying stock that receives a
“strong buy” or “buy” rating and selling stock that receives an “under perform” or
“sell” rating. I classify the recommendations into two categories: recommendations
on stocks held by mutual fund clients and recommendations on stocks not held by
mutual

fund

clients

(independent

recommendations).

Each

optimistic

recommendation is assumed to stop influencing investment behavior 250 trading
days after its report date unless the same analyst on the same stock issues a
downgrade to “under perform or sell”. In these cases, the returns are measured up to
the date of the change in recommendation (the downgrade). Similarly, each
pessimistic recommendation is assumed to stop influencing investment behavior 250
days after its report date unless an upgrade to “buy” or “strong buy” is made by the
same analyst on the same stock. Following Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007), I
compute the average daily raw return, market-adjusted abnormal return, and
abnormal returns from the market model.
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Table 12B presents the results. Investing systematically upon optimistic
recommendations relative to market consensus on stocks held by mutual fund clients
produces an economically large and statistically negative mean daily market-adjusted
return of -0.181%. The same investment strategy on stocks not held by mutual fund
clients generates a daily market-adjusted return of -0.064%, which is not significant.
For recommendations that are equal to or less optimistic than market consensus, the
investment returns of recommendations on stocks held by mutual fund clients are
higher than those of recommendations on stocks that are not held by mutual fund
clients. However, the differences are not statistically significant.
Overall, the optimistic analyst recommendations on stocks held by mutual fund
clients are associated with poorer investment returns compared to other analyst
recommendations. Therefore, my results on the short-term and long-term investment
returns from following the recommendations on the stocks that are held by mutual
fund clients against the stocks with no mutual fund client holding refute the argument
that analysts are more optimistic than market consensus because they have superior
stock-picking ability. These results corroborate my other test results that find that
analyst optimism on stocks held by mutual fund clients reflect one type of conflict of
interest facing a typical analyst: analysts are sacrificing their objectivity by issuing
optimistic reports on stocks held by mutual fund clients because of competition for
favorable appraisals from mutual fund managers and competition for trading
commissions allocated by the mutual fund industry.
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Chapter 5. Conclusions

There is a growing awareness that there are substantial conflicts of interest in
the financial services industry and these conflicts can lead to biased and even
fraudulent actions by agents. A great deal of publicity has been given to cases where
conflicts of interest have lead to substantial losses to investors. Examples include
front-running, insider trading on price-sensitive information, ponzi-schemes [e.g.,
Madoff, Stanford], biased analysts reports, and corporate scandals [Enron, Worldcom,
Parmalot, Ahold, HIH]. Most of the publicity relating to conflicts of interest comes
from the U.S. although other countries are not immune to these problems. Likewise,
most of the research on conflicts of interest comes from the U.S.
My study extends prior research by examining another potential conflict of
interest, namely analysts’ giving favorable recommendations on stocks already held
by the brokerage’s mutual fund clients. Here, the analysts’ bias their
recommendations to win more brokerage commissions from the client. Opposite to
the conventional view that analysts provide independent advice to clients, I argue
that the clients influence the analysts’ recommendations. My research extends prior
studies (e.g., Mola and Guidolin, 2009) by examining the relations between mutual
funds clients and brokerages that have business relations but no common ownership.
Furthermore, I carry out my study using Chinese data. One advantage in doing this is
that detailed commission fee data are available and this leads to finer tests than can
be done with U.S. data. China is also an interesting setting for my research because
very little is known about the financial services sector despite its extraordinary
growth in the past ten years.
Using data on brokerage analysts’ reports on Chinese stocks from 2004 to 2008,
I find that ‘buy’ and ‘strong buy’ recommendations are made on stocks that are
already owned by mutual fund clients of the brokerage. The evidence supports my
argument that mutual funds pressure brokerages and their analysts to issue optimistic
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recommendations on selected stocks (i.e., the stocks in the mutual funds portfolios).
This pressure is greatest from large mutual fund clients and it occurs in both bull and
bear markets. The state also exerts pressure on analysts’ recommendations. In
particular, some brokerages have political connections with the state and the analysts
at these brokerages give recommendations that are more favorable to state-controlled
listed firms although this effect is more pronounced in bear markets.
I find that in the short-term, stock prices do increase after a favorable
investment recommendation and so mutual funds’ performances improve.
Furthermore, some mutual funds take advantage of a favorable investment
recommendation by selling some of the recommended stocks. This positive stock
price reaction is tempered by the fact that favorable recommendations on
client-unrelated stocks earn even higher returns. Thus, investors recognize the analyst
optimism and discount the share prices where there is a potential conflict of interest.
In the longer-term, a policy of buying recommended stocks where there is a potential
conflict of interest results in negative returns.
Finally, my study suffers some limitations. Two of the most important dimensions
in an analyst report are buy or sell recommendations and forecasts of company
earnings. While I examine the former, I do not examine the impact of mutual fund
clients on analyst earnings forecasts because reliable data on analyst forecasts are
unavailable at the time the study was conducted. In future work it will be interesting
to expand my study to examine analyst earnings forecasts. Another limitation is that I
do not have detailed information on the trading transactions of institutional investors.
It is widely reported that institutional traders receive tips regarding the contents of
forthcoming analysts’ reports (Irvine, Lipson, Puckett, 2007). It would therefore be
useful to examine the trading of institutions immediately before the release of
analysts’ initial buy recommendations. Unfortunately, the daily trading data of
institutional investors is classified information and not available to researchers. If
such information becomes available in the future, this will permit a detailed
examination of mutual fund clients’ trading behavior around the release of analyst
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reports and this should yield interesting results.
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Table 1 Mutual fund industry and security firms in China

Table 1A Mutual fund industry
The Evolution of China's Mutual Fund Industry
2000

2001 2002 2003 2004

2005

2006

2007

New
Number of
Fund management companies Cumulative Total

0

5

6

12

12

8

4

3

10

15

21

33

45

53

57

60

Number of Funds
Net Asset Value
(in billion yuan)

Total

34

51

72

114

166

231

323

368

Total

84.56

81.80 124.40 176.24 327.28 510.39 818.48 3275.40

-

-

% of tradable shares held by mutual funds
% of tradable shares held by top 5 fund houses

-

4.1% 4.6%

6.1%

9.4%

15.9%

-

1.8% 1.8%

2.4%

3.8%

5.0%

Net asset value of the top 5 fund houses (in billion
84.56
42.38 54.09 67.42 131.06 212.20 332.92 1023.56
yuan)
net asset value of the top 5 fund houses as a
percent of total net asset value of mutual fund 100
51.81 43.48 38.25 40.42 41.58 40.68 31.25
industry
Source: compiled from www.jrj.com (webpage of “China Financial Industry”)
Web Link: http://news1.jrj.com.cn/news/2007-01-05/000001897594.html

Table 1B Brokerage firms
2002
Total operation
15.4
income
Security trading
7.8
Annual operation
commission
income (in billion
% of total
51.8%
Yuan)
operation income
Equity
1.5
underwriting
income
% of total
9.9%
operation income
Gross profit (in billion Yuan)
-0.4
Net Profit
-1.0
Source: compiled from the WIND Financial Database
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2003
14.2

2004
15.7

2005
13.4

2006
69.7

2007
315.2

7.4

10.2

8.4

37.1

174.4

52.2%

64.7%

62.5%

53.3%

55.3%

1.4

1.8

2.4

6.3

10.2

9.8%

11.2%

17.6%

9.1%

3.2%

0.9
0.3

-1.4
-4.4

-4.2
-5.6

30.1
25.8

205.9
141.1

Table 2 Definitions of variables
Variables
Relative recommendation
Relation dummy
Related holding
Commission

CEO political dummy
State own
Ceo_politicalxStateown
Other fund own
Oversea list dummy
ROA
Q
Revenue
Firm size
Div yield
Foreign broker dummy
Broker experience
All star dummy
Productivity
Industry coverage
Seniority
I-bank relation dummy
broker industry cover
broker region cover

Coverage number
Log quarter index

Individual investment recommendation minus the market consensus (the mean value of investment ratings of
all the analysts covering the same stock in the same quarter).
A dummy variable which is coded as one if the stock recommendation covers a firm that is already held by
the brokerage’s mutual fund clients.
The weight of the stock covered by analyst i in quarter t in the aggregate portfolio of the mutual fund clients
of i’s brokerage firm in quarter t-1.
Total commission payments from mutual fund clients that already hold stock j (covered by analyst i) to
analyst i’s brokerage firm as a proportion of the total trading commission from institutional investors to i’s
brokerage firm in quarter t-1.
A dummy that is equal to one if the CEO of a security firm was a government official or a military officer
before taking the position in the brokerage firm, zero otherwise.
Percent of shares owned by various levels of governments and its agencies.
The interaction of the CEO political dummy and State own.
The percent ratio between the shares held by un-related mutual funds and total shares outstanding of the firm.
A dummy that is equal to one if a firm has shares traded in an overseas stock exchange or China B share
market when the recommendation is issued, zero otherwise.
Return on assets of the covered firm.
The sum of the market value of equity and book value of long-term debt, divided by the book value of total
assets.
Operational revenue divided by total assets.
Log form of total assets.
Quarterly dividend per share divided by the closing stock price at the end of each quarter.
A dummy that is equal to one if the headquarter of the analyst’s brokerage firm is located overseas, zero
otherwise.
Number of years since the brokerage firm first established in China.
A dummy that is equal to one if the analyst is an “all-star” analyst when he/she issues the recommendation
according to the most recent New Fortune Chinese Best Analysts survey.
The number of analyst reports issued by analyst i as a proportion of the total number of analyst reports issued
by the brokerage firm that i works for.
The number of industries that the analyst covers.
Number of quarters since the analyst first showed up in the two databases.
A dummy that is equal to one if the analyst’s brokerage firm served as a lead or co-lead manager in the most
recent equity or debt issue prior to the time the recommendation is issued, zero otherwise.
The number of existing recommendations from analyst i’s brokerage firm that cover stocks belonging to
stock j’s industry as a proportion of the number of total existing recommendations issued by that brokerage
firm.
The number of existing recommendations from analyst i’s brokerage firm that cover firms whose
headquarters are in the same location as stock j as a proportion of the number of total existing
recommendations issued by that brokerage firm.
Log form of number of analysts covering the stock in quarter t.
Log form of quarterly market index of the stock exchange on which the stock lists.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of analyst-stock observations
Table 3A Descriptive statistics of analyst recommendation codes

5(strong buy)
4(buy)
3(hold)
2(under perform)
1(sell)
No. of recommendations
No. of brokerage firms
No. of analysts
No. of covered firms
Average recommendation

2004-2008
No.
Percent
5,107
27.18
8,323
44.29
4,597
24.47
571
3.04
192
1.02
18,790
59
1,613
1,354
3.94

2004
No.
80
134
188
47
45
494
33
236
323
3.31

Percent
16.19
27.13
38.06
9.51
9.11

2005
No.
178
505
693
155
73
1,604
40
483
762
3.34

47

Percent
11.10
31.48
43.20
9.66
4.55

2006
No.
745
1,132
1,010
142
39
3,068
44
632
870
3.78

Percent
24.28
36.90
32.92
4.63
1.27

2007
No.
2,338
3,931
1,814
156
27
8,685
55
1,014
1,054
4.02

Percent
28.28
47.56
21.95
1.89
0.33

First half of 2008
No.
Percent
1,766
32.96
2,621
48.92
892
16.65
71
1.33
8
0.15
5,409
50
912
833
4.13

Table 3B Descriptive statistics for the sample of analyst-stock observations

Covered stocks
Stock exchange
Shanghai A share
Shanghai B share
Shenzhen A share
Shenzhen B share
Industry
Manufacturing and Mining
Info Tech
Utility
Finance and Properties
Other
Pressures
Stocks held by mutual fund clients
State-owned shares covered by
politically connected analysts
Stocks underwritten by analysts’
security firms

Number of
stocks
1,354

% of the no. of stocks in
the same category
79.93%

% of the sample
recommendations
100%

744
10
590
10

87.22%
18.52%
80.60%
18.18%

62.38%
0.26%
37.03%
0.33%

836
82
55
116
265

79.69%
75.47%
81.81%
86.43%
82.86%

59.76%
5.15%
4.49%
11.21%
19.39%

607
900

35.83%
53.13%

38.41%
27.13%

352

20.78%

3.92%

The sample consists of 18,790 firm-analyst observation from the 1st quarter of 2004 to the 2nd
quarter of 2008, using data from the WIND Financial Database and Institutional Brokers’
Estimation System (I/B/E/S). I reverse the original recommendation code in the database, i.e. the
recommendation score ranges from 1(sell) to 5 (strong buy). For cases in which the same analyst
issues more than one different recommendation on a stock in quarter t, I keep the first
recommendations he/she issues in that quarter. I remove all the recommendations staying in the
databases for more than two years since they are likely to be stale. Furthermore, I remove all the
recommendations in which the issuers’ (analysts’) names are missing because I cannot have any
analyst-specific information on those recommendations. The two screening strategies result in
18,790 active recommendations. Industry classification follows the CSRC industry classification.
The three kinds of pressures are defined in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
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Table 4 Summary statistics
Variables

Number of obs.

Mean

Median

Standard
deviation

Recommendation
Relative recommendation
18,790
-0.01
0
0.58
Mutual fund pressure
Related holding
18,721
0.004
0
0.007
Commission
18,790
0.08
0.01
0.18
Firm Characteristics
State own
18,514
0.27
0.26
0.26
Other fund own
18,790
0.14
0.08
0.17
Oversea list dummy
18,655
0.15
0
0.36
ROA
18,548
0.04
0.03
0.05
Q
16,265
2.35
1.75
1.98
Revenue
18,509
0.21
0.17
0.18
Firm size
18,665
13.27
12.96
1.75
Div yield
18,790
0.004
0
0.026
Broker Characteristics
Foreign broker dummy
18,790
0.04
0
0.19
CEO political dummy
18,790
0.43
0
0.50
Broker experience
18,790
7.61
9
2.20
Analyst Characteristics
All star dummy
18,790
0.13
0
0.34
Productivity
18,790
0.08
0.05
0.10
Industry coverage
18,790
2.56
2
1.69
Seniority (quarters)
18,790
13.66
10
11.88
Investment bank pressure
I-bank relation dummy
18,790
0.04
0
0.19
Other controls
Coverage no
18,790
4.26
3
3.56
Quarter index
18,748
5995.81
4058.59
4660.85
The sample consists of 18,790 firm-broker observation from the 1st quarter of 2004 to the 2nd
quarter of 2008, representing the data from the WIND Financial Database and Institutional
Brokers’ Estimation System (I/B/E/S). The definitions of variables are provided in Table 2.
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Table 5 Firm characteristics and analyst characteristics for stocks receiving investment ratings
Panel 5A Firm characteristics for stocks receiving investment ratings
All time periods
Above market
Equal or below
consensus
mkt consensus

Difference

Bull market period
Above market Equal or below
consensus
mkt consensus

Difference

Bear market period
Above market Equal or below
consensus
mkt consensus

Difference

Financial transparency
0.18
0.13
0.04***
0.15
0.12
0.03***
0.20
0.16
0.04***
Oversea list
Firm performance
0.05
0.04
0.01***
0.04
0.035
0.005***
0.051
0.047
0.004***
ROA
2.62
2.21
0.41***
3.32
2.92
0.40***
1.92
1.68
0.24***
Q
0.22
0.20
0.01***
0.21
0.20
0.01***
0.22
0.21
0.01***
Revenue
0.004
0.005
-0.001*** 0.006
0.007
-0.001*
0.002
0.002
0.000*
Div yield
Firm size
13.57
13.11
0.46***
13.33
12.87
0.46***
13.81
13.42
0.39***
Firm size
Ownership structure
0.27
0.27
0.00
0.26
0.26
0.00
0.29
0.29
0.00
State own
0.14
0.13
0.01*
0.13
0.12
0.01*
0.16
0.15
0.01*
Institutional own
Mean values of variables for financial transparency, firm performance, firm size and ownership structure are presented in respective rows. Difference is the
comparison of the average values between firms receiving more favorable rating and firms receiving equal-or-less than market consensus ratings. I use a standard
two-tail t-test to test the statistical significance of the differences. “***” and “*” stand for 1% significance level and 10% significance level, respectively. Bull market
period is from June 6th, 2005 to October 16th, 2007; the rest of my sample period is a bear market period.
Panel 5B Analyst characteristics for stocks receiving investment ratings
No. of ratings
Strong buy
Buy
Hold or worse
Average ratings
Average (Rec.-consensus)
Foreign broker
726
6.61%
29.48% 63.91%
3.15***
-0.54***
Domestic broker
18,064
28.01%
44.89% 27.10%
3.97
0.004
“All star” analyst
2,546
36.17%
41.08% 22.75%
4.11***
0.10***
Non- “all star” analyst 16,244
25.77%
44.80% 29.43%
3.91
-0.03
I exclude the sample recommendations where the analysts’ names are ambiguous. An analyst is from a foreign security firm if the headquarters of the analyst’s
security firm is located overseas. For an analyst i covering a stock j, the analyst i is an all-star analyst (allstar) if i ranks in the top three of all the analysts covering
stock j’s industry according to the most recent New Fortune Chinese Best Analysts survey. I compare the difference of average recommendations and average relative
recommendations between analysts from foreign security firms and those from domestic security firms, as well as between all-star analysts and ordinary analysts. I use
standard two-tail t-tests to test the statistical significance of the differences. “***” stands for the 1% significance level.
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Table 6 Univariate analysis on analyst ratings and institutional and political pressure

Panel 6A Analyst ratings and portfolio weight terciles of their mutual fund clients
Portfolio weight terciles
Independent reports
Portfolio weight = 0
No. of Obs.= 11,572
1st tercile
Low portfolio weight
Median= 0.43%
2nd tercile
Mid portfolio weight
Median= 0.81%
3rd tercile
High portfolio weight
Median= 1.49%
Overall related reports
Median= 0.81%
No. of Obs.= 7,218

Rating codes

All time
periods
21.40%
43.37%
35.23%
3.79
-0.05
24.52%
51.70%
23.77%
3.98***
-0.08***
40.73%
45.76%
13.51%
4.25***
0.06***
44.10%
42.06%
13.84%
4.27***
0.11***
36.45%
46.51%
17.04%
4.17***
0.03***

5: Strong buy
4: Buy
1-3: Hold or worse
Average ratings
Avg(rec.-consensus)
5: Strong buy
4: Buy
1-3: Hold or worse
Average ratings
Avg(rec.-consensus)
5: Strong buy
4: Buy
1-3: Hold or worse
Average ratings
Avg(rec.-consensus)
5: Strong buy
4: Buy
1-3: Hold or worse
Average ratings
Avg(rec.-consensus)
5: Strong buy
4: Buy
1-3: Hold or worse
Average ratings
Avg(rec.-consensus)

Bull market
period
17.32%
41.73%
40.95%
3.70
-0.06
19.78%
49.45%
30.77%
3.86***
-0.11***
38.34%
44.72%
16.94%
4.19***
0.12***
38.08%
44.42%
17.50%
4.17***
0.12***
32.01%
46.21%
21.78%
4.07***
0.04***

Bear market
period
33.45%
46.02%
20.53%
3.93
-0.03
35.59%
47.28%
17.14%
4.09***
-0.05*
35.67%
47.29%
17.04%
4.30***
0.02***
35.72%
47.21%
17.08%
4.37***
0.11***
35.53%
47.07%
17.40%
4.25***
0.02***

Panel 6B Analyst ratings and state ownership terciles of covered stocks
State ownership
Recommendations on
stocks with no state
ownership
No. of Obs.=6,675
Non-political-connected
recommendations on
state-owned stocks
No. of Obs.=6,741
Politically connected
recommendations on
state-owned stocks
No. of Obs.=5,098

Rating codes

All
periods
26.80%
45.35%
27.85%
3.95
-0.02
24.45%
46.17%
29.39%
3.87
-0.04
31.27%
41.35%
27.38%
4.01***
0.05***

5: Strong buy
4: Buy
1-3: Hold or worse
Average ratings
Avg(rec.-consensus)
5: Strong buy
4: Buy
1-3: Hold or worse
Average ratings
Avg(rec.-consensus)
5: Strong buy
4: Buy
1-3: Hold or worse
Average ratings
Avg(rec.-consensus)

time

Bull
market
period
22.18%
43.32%
34.50%
3.83
-0.02
20.10%
45.34%
34.56%
3.77
-0.02
24.08%
41.11%
34.81%
3.86
0.06***

Bear market
period
29.86%
44.74%
25.40%
4.16
-0.01
27.11%
45.20%
27.69%
3.97
-0.05
32.60%
39.62%
27.78%
4.14
0.06***

Portfolio weight is defined as the weight of stock j in all the mutual fund clients’ portfolios at quarter t-1. In Panel
A, “***” (“*”) indicates that the mean value of absolute recommendation codes and relative recommendation
codes issued by analysts who are subjected to pressure from their mutual fund clients are significantly different at
or below the 1% (5%) significance level than the reports that are independent from mutual fund pressure according
to two-tailed t-tests. In Panel B, “***” indicates that the mean value of absolute recommendation codes and
relative recommendation codes issued by politically connected analysts on state-owned shares are significantly
higher at or below the 1% significance level than their counterparts of non-political-connected analyst reports on
state-owned shares according to two-tailed t-tests. The bull market period lasts from June 6th, 2005 to October 16th,
2007. The rest of my sample period are bear market periods.
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Table7 Mutual fund client and political pressure on analysts’ relative recommendations
Analyst recommendations relative to market consensus
Panel regression with fixed effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutual fund pressure
0.042
0.054
0.023
0.034
0.023
0.033
Related holdingt-1
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]***
0.230
0.241
0.230
0.239
Commission t-1
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Political pressure
0.059
0.092
Ceo_political×Stateown
[0.046]**
[0.000]***
Firm Characteristics
-0.013
-0.006
-0.013
-0.006
-0.039
-0.046
State own t-1
[0.489]
[0.731]
[0.461]
[0.750]
[0.080]*
[0.031]**
-0.063
-0.053
-0.056
-0.047
-0.056
-0.045
Other fund own t-1
[0.032]**
[0.078]*
[0.054]*
[0.119]
[0.054]*
[0.134]
0.024
0.008
0.030
0.013
0.030
0.013
Oversea list dummy
[0.074]*
[0.561]
[0.027]**
[0.339]
[0.029]**
[0.347]
0.041
0.015
0.047
0.266
0.051
0.041
ROA t-1
[0.714]
[0.895]
[0.675]
[0.815]
[0.650]
[0.716]
0.001
0.001
-0.003
-0.003
-0.003
-0.003
Q t-1
[0.615]
[0.728]
[0.381]
[0.347]
[0.386]
[0.350]
-0.016
-0.009
-0.018
-0.012
-0.018
-0.011
Revenue t-1
[0.544]
[0.708]
[0.495]
[0.624]
[0.501]
[0.653]
0.004
0.001
-0.007
-0.009
-0.007
-0.008
Firm size t-1
[0.446]
[0.868]
[0.196]
[0.070]*
[0.214]
[0.089]*
-0.142
-0.134
-0.133
-0.138
-0.132
-0.134
Div yield t-1
[0.537]
[0.578]
[0.561]
[0.564]
[0.564]
[0.575]
Broker Characteristics
-0.600
-0.581
-0.581
-0.572
-0.565
Foreign broker dummy -0.602
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
0.013
0.019
0.014
0.019
0.013
0.018
Broker experience
[0.182]
[0.001]*** [0.162]
[0.001]*** [0.206]
[0.003]***
Analyst Characteristics
0.023
0.105
0.022
0.107
0.022
0.107
All star dummy
[0.303]
[0.000]*** [0.304]
[0.000]*** [0.303]
[0.000]***
0.011
-0.037
0.010
-0.042
0.014
-0.043
Productivity
[0.884]
[0.501]
[0.890]
[0.447]
[0.856]
[0.435]
-0.004
-0.005
-0.004
-0.005
-0.004
-0.005
Industry coverage
[0.394]
[0.095]*
[0.334]
[0.070]*
[0.323]
[0.074]*
0.001
-0.000
0.001
-0.000
0.001
-0.000
Seniority
[0.171]
[0.577]
[0.058]*
[0.848]
[0.066]*
[0.741]
Investment bank
pressure
0.090
0.070
0.087
0.070
0.086
I-bank relation dummy 0.073
[0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]***
Other controls
0.006
0.000
0.005
-0.000
0.005
-0.001
Coverage no
[0.370]
[0.997]
[0.468]
[0.947]
[0.481]
[0.894]
-0.011
-0.011
-0.013
-0.012
0.051
-0.012
Log quarter index
[0.109]
[0.107]
[0.058]*
[0.083]*
[0.650]
[0.089]*
Random analyst effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Random firm effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Wald Chi-squared
350.63
785.39
312.44
391.20
396.50
843.42
Prob>Chi-squared
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Pseudo R2
0.045
0.048
0.044
0.047
0.048
0.051

Ordered probit
(7)
0.054
[0.003]***
0.704
[0.000]***
0.112
[0.025]**
-0.092
[0.034]**
-0.128
[0.053]*
0.036
[0.250]
-0.181
[0.429]
-0.010
[0.123]
0.023
[0.684]
-0.034
[0.001]***
-0.061
[0.875]
-0.720
[0.000]***
0.019
[0.104]
0.185
[0.000]***
-0.149
[0.151]
-0.006
[0.284]
0.001
[0.522]

0.156
[0.001]***
0.006
[0.719]
-0.015
[0.258]

404.85
0.000
0.015

Analysis time is 18 quarters, with the first quarter of 2004 representing time 0. Random effects
GLS are panel regressions in which the random errors are decomposed into a cross-section,
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illustrating stock analyst level (column 1, column 3 and column 5) or firm level heterogeneity
(column 2, column 4 and column 6), and a time series component. The dependent variable is
relative recommendations, defined as recommendations minus the quarterly market consensus.
The definitions of independent variables are provided in Table 3. The ordered probit with robust
standard errors in the last column models the three-level choice facing with a typical analyst:
issuing an above, at, or below consensus recommendation. P values are in parenthesis. *, **, ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% percent levels, respectively. The number
of observations in all models is 15,677. This is 3,113 less than the available number of
firm-analyst quarters, because of missing observations on firm characteristic variables.
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Table 8 Endogenous coverage selection
Variables

Mutual fund pressure
Related holdingt-1
Commission t-1
Political pressure
Ceo_political×Stateown
Firm Characteristics
State own t-1
Other fund own t-1
Oversea list dummy
ROA t-1
Q t-1
Revenue t-1
Firm size t-1
Div yield t-1
Broker Characteristics
Foreign broker dummy
Broker experience
Analyst Characteristics
All star dummy
Productivity
Industry coverage
Seniority
I- bank pressure
I-bank relation dummy
Other controls
Coverage no
Log quarter index

Recommendation relative to market consensus
Large firms only
Heckman selection model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
1st step
2nd step
1st step
2nd step
0.032
[0.000]***
0.183
[0.000]***

0.038
[0.000]***
0.200
[0.000]***

0.312
[0.000]***

0.050
[0.000]***

0.300
[0.000]***
0.243
[0.000]***

0.033
[0.000]***
0.164
[0.000]***

0.111
[0.009]***

0.136
[0.000]***

0.097
[0.004]***

0.061
[0.009]***

0.098
[0.004]***

0.061
[0.008]***

-0.074
[0.025]**
-0.077
[0.087]*
0.022
[0.191]
0.301
[0.109]
-0.003
[0.599]
-0.024
[0.584]
-0.004
[0.618]
-0.410
[0.235]

-0.072
[0.024]**
-0.055
[0.238]
0.010
[0.577]
0.253
[0.180]
-0.005
[0.343]
-0.020
[0.630]
-0.008
[0.323]
-0.430
[0.225]

1.305
[0.000]***
-0.099
[0.000]***
0.629
[0.000]***
4.313
[0.000]***
0.141
[0.000]***
0.532
[0.000]***
0.388
[0.000]***
-0.926
[0.000]***

0.027
[0.203]
-0.003
[0.001]***
-0.003
[0.818]
0.113
[0.299]
0.002
[0.512]
0.010
[0.677]
0.001
[0.713]
-0.096
[0.674]

1.305
[0.000]***
-0.099
[0.000]***
0.622
[0.000]***
4.312
[0.000]***
0.140
[0.000]***
0.535
[0.000]***
0.381
[0.000]***
-0.921
[0.000]***

0.023
[0.274]
-0.002
[0.015]**
0.005
[0.685]
0.105
[0.332]
-0.001
[0.610]
0.007
[0.770]
-0.007
[0.085]*
-0.095
[0.677]

-0.599
[0.000]***
0.031
[0.020]**

-0.587
[0.000]***
0.034
[0.000]***

-0.618
[0.000]***
-0.053
[0.000]***

-0.541
[0.000]***
0.017
[0.002]***

-0.608
[0.000]***
-0.053
[0.000]***

-0.522
[0.000]***
0.017
[0.002]***

0.044
[0.154]
0.030
[0.777]
-0.006
[0.352]
0.001
[0.516]

0.118
[0.000]***
-0.032
[0.694]
-0.007
[0.102]
-0.001
[0.193]

0.045
[0.216]

0.065
[0.083]*

0.212
[0.000]***

0.113
[0.000]***

0.210
[0.000]***

0.111
[0.000]***

0.001
[0.905]
-0.298
[0.007]***

0.002
[0.853]
-0.026
[0.021]**

0.451
[0.000]***
0.339
[0.000]***

0.008
[0.234]
-0.003
[0.638]

0.450
[0.000]***

0.005
[0.502]
-0.005
[0.444]

0.104
[0.000]***
-0.073
[0.160]
-0.003
[0.314]
-0.000
[0.234]

Instruments
Broker industry cover

0.440
[0.000]***
1.361
[0.000]***

Broker region cover
Random analyst effects
Random firm effects
Mill’s lambda

Yes

Wald Chi-squared
Prob>Chi-squared
Pseudo R2

282.56
0.000
0.061

0.104
[0.000]***
-0.085
[0.104]
-0.003
[0.328]
-0.000
[0.351]

0.441
[0.000]***
1.358
[0.000]***

Yes
0.038
[0.002]***
41818.55
0.000

528.32
0.000
0.064
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0.025
[0.043]**
41840.57
0.000

Analysis time is 18 quarters, with the first quarter of 2004 representing time 0. The models in the
first two columns replicate column 3 and column 4 in table 7 using the subsample for large firms
only. Large firms are defined as the firms with sizes higher than the median firm size in each
CSRC industry classification, ranked quarterly by total asset value. The last fmy columns use the
full sample and are estimated as two-step Heckman selection models. The number of censored and
uncensored observations is 499,052 and 15,677, respectively. Column 3 and column 5 are the first
step, while column 4 and column 6 present the second step. I also report the Mill’s lambda and its
significance levels. The dependent variable is relative recommendations, defined as
recommendations minus the quarterly market consensus. The definitions of independent variables
and instruments are provided in Table 3. P values are in parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% percent levels, respectively.
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Table 9 The composition of mutual fund clients and analysts’ relative recommendation
Variables

Mutual fund pressure
Large related holdingt-1
Small related holdingt-1

Recommendation relative to market consensus

Panel regression with random effects
(3)
(4)
(5)

(1)

(2)

2.399
[0.000]***
0.425
[0.188]

2.699
[0.000]***
0.619
[0.064]*

Commission t-1

1.514
[0.001]***
-0.131
[0.698]
0.218
[0.000]***

1.719
[0.000]***
0.033
[0.925]
0.233
[0.000]***

Political pressure
Ceo_political×Stateown
Firm Characteristics
State own t-1
Other fund own t-1
Oversea list dummy
ROA t-1
Q t-1
Revenue t-1
Firm size t-1
Div yield t-1
Broker Characteristics
Foreign broker dummy
Broker experience
Analyst Characteristics
All star dummy
Productivity
Industry coverage
Seniority
I- bank pressure
I-bank relation dummy
Other controls
Coverage no
Log quarter index
Random analyst effects
Random firm effects
Wald Chi-squared
Prob>Chi-squared
Pseudo R2

(6)

1.512
[0.001]***
-0.127
[0.706]
0.217
[0.000]***

1.713
[0.000]***
0.004
[0.991]
0.231
[0.000]***

0.059
[0.045]**

0.094
[0.000]***

-0.014
[0.454]
-0.056
[0.055]*
0.026
[0.059]*
0.046
[0.686]
-0.000
[0.961]
-0.016
[0.531]
0.002
[0.729]
-0.153
[0.504]

-0.006
[0.740]
-0.046
[0.127]
0.009
[0.528]
0.024
[0.832]
-0.000
[0.895]
-0.010
[0.680]
-0.000
[0.918]
-0.144
[0.548]

-0.015
[0.417]
-0.054
[0.065]*
0.029
[0.030]**
0.054
[0.629]
-0.003
[0.320]
-0.017
[0.524]
-0.006
[0.239]
-0.142
[0.534]

-0.007
[0.716]
-0.045
[0.136]
0.012
[0.376]
0.037
[0.746]
-0.003
[0.305]
-0.011
[0.653]
-0.008
[0.103]
-0.146
[0.543]

-0.040
[0.069]*
-0.054
[0.066]*
0.030
[0.032]**
0.058
[0.605]
-0.003
[0.324]
-0.016
[0.530]
-0.006
[0.258]
-0.142
[0.536]

-0.047
[0.026]**
-0.143
[0.153]
0.012
[0.385]
0.052
[0.649]
-0.003
[0.308]
-0.010
[0.685]
-0.008
[0.129]
-0.142
[0.554]

-0.603
[0.000]***
0.014
[0.170]

-0.605
[0.000]***
0.020
[0.001]***

-0.586
[0.000]***
0.014
[0.149]

-0.588
[0.000]***
0.020
[0.001]***

-0.578
[0.000]***
0.013
[0.192]

-0.573
[0.000]***
0.018
[0.002]***

0.021
[0.318]
0.013
[0.867]
-0.004
[0.362]
0.001
[0.149]

0.105
[0.000]***
-0.033
[0.547]
-0.005
[0.084]*
-0.000
[0.600]

0.022
[0.302]
0.008
[0.919]
-0.004
[0.324]
0.001
[0.055]*

0.107
[0.000]***
-0.045
[0.414]
-0.005
[0.067]*
-0.000
[0.883]

0.022
[0.301]
0.011
[0.884]
-0.004
[0.314]
0.001
[0.063]*

0.107
[0.000]***
-0.046
[0.400]
-0.005
[0.070]*
-0.000
[0.774]

0.072
[0.002]***

0.088
[0.000]***

0.069
[0.002]***

0.086
[0.000]***

0.069
[0.002]***

0.086
[0.000]***

0.005
[0.477]
-0.011
[0.108]

-0.001
0.884
-0.011
[0.117]

0.005
[0.491]
-0.013
[0.059]*

-0.001
[0.926]
-0.012
[0.083]*

0.005
[0.505]
-0.132
[0.059]*

-0.001
[0.874]
-0.012
[0.089]*

Yes
363.65
0.000
0.045

Yes
Yes
791.33
0.000
0.048

394.50
0.000
0.047

Yes
Yes
825.60
0.000
0.050

399.89
0.000
0.048

Yes
841.13
0.000
0.051

Large related holding is defined as the 20% largest mutual funds in terms of total equity value
under management in the previous year. Small related holding is the non-large mutual funds. The
dependent variable is analyst recommendation relative to market consensus. The definitions of the
independent variables are provided in Table 3. The estimation models are identical to those in
Table 7. P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%
significance levels, respectively.
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Table 10 Change in the portfolio weight of a covered stock and analyst optimism
Variables
Relative recommendation dummyt
All star relative recommendation
dummyt

Active change in portfolio weight
(1)

(2)

-0.002
[0.062]*
-0.001

-0.003
[0.037]**
-0.002

[0.788]

[0.601]

Relative recommendation
dummyt-1
All star relative recommendation
dummyt-1
Change in ROAt
Change in Revenuet
Change in firm sizet
Change in Qt
Change in dividend yieldt
Change in stock pricet
Change in stock indext
Change in holdings by other
mutual fundst
Change in the no. of other mutual
fundst
Random broker effects
Random firm effects

(3)

(4)

-0.003

-0.004

[0.049]**

[0.030]**

0.005

0.004

0.070
[0.000]***
0.000
[0.003]***
0.014
[0.000]***

0.069
[0.000]***
0.000
[0.001]***
0.014
[0.000]***

[0.158]
0.070
[0.000]***
0.000
[0.003]***
0.014
[0.000]***

[0.232]
0.069
[0.000]***
0.000
[0.001]***
0.014
[0.000]***

0.005
[0.000]***
0.092

0.005
[0.000]***
0.092

0.005
[0.000]***
0.092

0.005
[0.000]***
0.092

[0.000]***
0.001
[0.000]***
0.020
[0.000]***
0.040

[0.000]***
0.001
[0.000]***
0.019
[0.000]***
0.039

[0.000]***
0.001
[0.000]***
0.020
[0.000]***
0.040

[0.000]***
0.001
[0.000]***
0.020
[0.000]***
0.039

[0.000]***
0.014

[0.000]***
0.014

[0.000]***
0.014

[0.000]***
0.014

[0.000]***
Yes

[0.000]***

[0.000]***
Yes

[0.000]***

Wald Chi-squared

3734.81

Yes
3740.08

3733.95

Yes
3737.61

Prob>Chi-squared

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Pseudo R2

0.054

0.054

0.054

0.054

The dependent variable is the change in the weight of a covered stock in mutual fund clients’ portfolios.
The change is measured from the end of quarter t to the end of quarter t-1. Random effects GLS are panel
regressions in which the random errors are decomposed into a cross-section, illustrating stock broker
(brokerage firm) level (column 1 and column 3) or firm level heterogeneity (column 2 and column 4), and
a time series component. The independent variables are measured as the change of the respective firm
characteristic between quarter t and quarter t-1. Relative recommendation dummy is equal to one if at least
one business-related analyst issues a more optimistic recommendation (relative to market consensus) on
the stock held by the mutual fund clients, zero otherwise. All-star relative recommendation dummy is equal
to one if at least one business-related all-star analyst issues a more optimistic recommendation (relative to
market consensus) on the stock held by the mutual fund clients, zero otherwise. I use both
contemporaneous relative recommendations and one quarter lagged relative recommendations. P-values
are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 11 Bull and Bear market analysis on analyst behavior
Variables
(1)
Mutual fund pressure
Related holding t-1
Commission t-1
Political pressure
Ceo_political×Stateown

Firm Characteristics
State own t-1
Other fund own t-1
Oversea list dummy
ROA t-1
Q t-1
Revenue t-1
Firm size t-1
Div yield t-1
Broker Characteristics
Foreign broker dummy
Broker experience
Analyst Characteristics
All star dummy
Productivity
Industry coverage
Seniority
Investment bank pressure
I-bank relation dummy
Other controls
Coverage no
Log quarter index
Random analyst Effects
Random firm Effects
Wald Chi-squared
Prob>Chi-squared
Pseudo R2

Recommendation relative to market consensus
Bear Market
Bull Market
(2)
(3)
(4)

0.023
[0.066]*
0.173
[0.000]***

0.034
[0.010]***
0.176
[0.001]***

0.022
[0.027]**
0.296
[0.000]***

0.030
[0.004]***
0.330
[0.000]***

0.073
[0.100]*

0.155
[0.000]***

0.009
[0.821]

0.026
[0.444]

-0.051
[0.143]
-0.021
[0.612]
0.030
[0.101]
0.283
[0.075]*
-0.009
[0.022]**
-0.034
[0.324]
-0.013
[0.099]*
0.387
[0.468]

-0.053
[0.115]
-0.018
[0.681]
0.012
[0.540]
0.250
[0.129]
-0.007
[0.083]*
-0.014
[0.679]
-0.014
[0.065]*
0.052
[0.927]

-0.026
[0.369]
-0.073
[0.070]*
0.021
[0.281]
-0.193
[0.231]
0.000
[0.973]
0.004
[0.927]
0.001
[0.933]
-0.284
[0.267]

-0.034
[0.224]
-0.069
[0.094]*
0.015
[0.435]
-0.180
[0.263]
-0.001
[0.926]
0.008
[0.832]
0.005
[0.503]
-0.174
[0.510]

-0.574
[0.000]***
0.004
[0.783]

-0.500
[0.000]***
-0.003
[0.773]

-0.581
[0.000]***
0.025
[0.030]**

-0.593
[0.000]***
0.035
[0.000]***

0.061
[0.085]*
0.040
[0.733]
-0.000
[0.942]
0.001
[0.096]*

0.102
[0.000]***
-0.168
[0.041]**
-0.003
[0.561]
0.001
[0.099]*

0.064
[0.015]**
0.079
[0.424]
-0.005
[0.369]
-0.001
[0.134]

0.108
[0.000]***
0.034
[0.649]
-0.008
[0.044]**
-0.002
[0.007]***

0.050
[0.103]

0.083
[0.011]**

0.070
[0.032]**

0.086
[0.010]***

0.008
[0.379]
-0.013
[0.182]

-0.002
[0.814]
-0.018
[0.070]*

0.001
[0.940]
-0.004
[0.673]

-0.001
[0.908]
-0.005
[0.599]

Yes

Yes

161.02
0.000
0.039

Yes
319.70
0.000
0.043

303.54
0.000
0.062

Yes
570.12
0.000
0.063

I split my sample into bear market period (column 1 and column 2) and bull market period (column 3
and column 4) and replicate my analysis in Table 7. The bull market period lasts from June 6th, 2005 to
October 16th, 2007. The rest of my sample period are bear market periods.P values are in parenthesis. *, ** and
*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively.
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Table 12 Investment returns from following analyst recommendations

Table 12A Mean 3-day abnormal return around the recommendation date
Overall

Independent

Difference

0.49%

Fund-relate
d
0.28%

0.62%

0.70%

0.57%

0.84%

0.34%
[0.000]***
0.27%

Less optimistic than market consensus

0.12%+

0.04%+

0.17%

Strong buy

1.02%

0.61%

1.44%

Buy

0.52%

0.24%

0.71%

Hold or worse

-0.01%+

-0.34%

-0.00%+

All recommendations
More
optimistic
consensus

than

market

[0.050]**
0.13%
[0.206]
0.84%
[0.000]***
0.47%
[0.000]***
0.34%
[0.046]**

I use the standard market model to compute the abnormal returns. The estimation period is from
day -126 to day -7 before the analyst recommendation and the market index is the equally
weighted returns on all stocks on the Shanghai or Shenzhen index (stock j is listed on either the
Shanghai or the Shenzhen stock exchange). Day 0 marks the recommendation date. The three-day
abnormal returns are statistically larger than 0 at the 1% significance level except for those with a
“ +”superscript. Difference is defined as the average daily abnormal return associated with
fund-unrelated (independent) recommendations minus the fund-related recommendations. P values
for two tailed statistics are presented in parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 12B Daily returns from a buy-and-hold strategy that acts on analyst
recommendations
Overall

Fund related

Independent

Difference

recommendations

recommendations

(a)- (b)

(a)

(b)

More optimistic

(1)

Raw return

0.025%

-0.045%

0.029%

-0.074%

than market

(2)

Mkt-adj.

-0.048%

-0.181%**

-0.064%

-0.117%

-0.000%

-0.060%

0.053%

-0.114%

consensus

return
(3)

Market
model

Equal or less

(4)

Raw return

0.105%

0.171%

0.083%

0.088%

optimistic than

(5)

Mkt-adj.

0.005%

0.044%

-0.021%

0.065%

0.000%

0.047%

-0.041%

0.088%

market consensus

return
(6)

Market
model

This table reports the average daily raw buy-and-hold returns, average daily market-adjusted
buy-and-hold returns and average daily abnormal returns from acting on the analyst recommendations.

Each recommendation is assumed to stop influencing investment behavior after 250 trading day after its
report date unless a downgrade to “under perform” or “sell” is issued by the same analyst on the same
stock for a “strong buy” or “buy” recommendation within 250 trading days, or an upgrade to “buy” or
“strong buy” is issued by the same analyst on the same stock for an “under perform” or “sell”
recommendation within the 250 trading days. I use a two-tailed t-test to examine whether
market-adjusted returns and market model returns are statistically different from 0. In addition, I use a
two-tailed t-test to examine whether the market-adjusted return and return from the market model are
statistically different across fund-related analyst reports and independent analyst reports. *, ** and ***
denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively.
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